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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce
entered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah on October 2, 1992.

The Utah Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(h)
(1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the court abused its discretion in ordering Mr.

Brooks to pay one-half of the minor child's prospective private
school expenses and in entering judgment against Mr. Brooks for
one-half of all private school expenses incurred on behalf of the
minor child from and after the date of the filing of the Amended
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.
2.

Whether the court abused its discretion in finding that

Mr. Brooks has a financial ability to assist Mrs. Nunley in paying
private school expenses for and on behalf of the minor child in
addition to paying his regular child support payments.
3.

Whether or not the court erred, as a matter of law, in

determining that it did not have the authority to apply the Social
Security benefits received by Mrs. Nunley on behalf of the minor
child

by

reason

of

Mr.

Brooks*

permanent

disability

toward

satisfaction of his past and ongoing obligation to pay one-half of
Michelle's private school expenses.
4.

Whether the court abused its discretion in considering

evidence submitted by Mrs. Nunley relating to amounts incurred by
her for the medical and dental expenses and private school expenses

for the parties' minor child after trial without allowing Mr.
Brooks opportunity for hearing and cross-examination.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.
Rebuttable guidelines.

Determination of amount of support -

(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount
granted by prior court order unless there has been a
material change of circumstance on the part of the
obligor or obligee.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the
guidelines, the court shall establish support after
considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the
the
the
the
the
the
the
for

standard of living and situation of the parties;
relative wealth and income of the parties;
ability of the obligor to earn;
ability of the obligee to earn;
needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
ages of the parties; and
responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee
the support of others.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5
income.

Determination of gross income - Imputed

(8) (b) Social Security benefits received by a child due
to the earnings of a parent may be credited as child
support to the parent upon whose earning record it is
based, by crediting the amount against the potential
obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a
child may be considered as income to a parent depending
upon the circumstances of each case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were granted a divorce by the Superior Court of
California, County of Los Angeles, in approximately August of 1985.
The California Decree of Divorce provided that the parties were
2

awarded joint legal and physical custody of their minor child,
Michelle, with the plaintiff to have primary physical custody.

The

court ordered Mr. Brooks to pay Mrs. Nunley child support in the
amount of $300 per month and ordered Mrs. Nunley to pay $100 per
month to Mr. Brooks during any month in which the minor child
resided with Mr. Brooks for sixteen or more days.

In addition,

Mrs. Nunley was ordered to pay the costs of transporting
the minor child to and from her visitation with Mr. Brooks.
Originally, in June of 1988, the plaintiff brought a Petition
for Modification of Foreign Divorce Decree on the sole issue of
which party was to bear the expense of the transportation of the
minor child from Utah, where Mrs. Nunley resided, to Montana where
Mr.

Brooks

had moved.

Mr. Brooks

filed

a counter-motion

for

modification seeking to enforce his rights of visitation and for a
judgment against the plaintiff
under the California Decree.

for unpaid transportation

costs

In approximately November of 1988,

Mrs. Nunley filed an Amended Petition for Modification of Foreign
Divorce Decree, and, in addition to the foregoing, she requested
increased child support and an order requiring the defendant to pay
for one-half of Michelle's medical expenses, including insurance
premiums, and one-half of all of Michelle's private school tuition,
costs and expenses.
The case went to trial on April 22, 1991, and the court
entered its Minute Entry on or about April 26, 1991, wherein, among
other things, Mr. Brooks was ordered to pay one-half of the private
school expenses of the minor child and the court ordered
3

that

judgment

be

expenses.

entered

against

him

lor

any

arrearages

for

such

The court also ruled that Mr. Brooks was entitled to a

credit towards his obligation to pay private school expenses for
Social Security benefits paid to the minor child as a result of Mr.
Brooks ' disability.
Thereafter, Mrs. Nunley filed a Motion for Clarification of
Ruling and for In-Camera Interview to which Mr. Brooks objected.
There followed a series of post-trial motions by both parties which
are more particularly described below.
submission by Mrs. Nunley of financial

These motions

included

information relating to

amounts she had incurred for the minor child's medical expenses and
private school expenses which she had not introduced at trial, and
Mr. Brooks' objection thereto on the basis that either the evidence
was barred by her failure to introduce it at trial, or he was
entitled to a hearing on the new information at which he could
cross-examine Mrs. Nunley and raise objections

relating to the

evidence.
In the course of considering the post-trial motions of the
parties and the objections thereto, Judge Moffat changed the ruling
made in his Minute Entry of April, 1991 so that the final Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce does not allow Mr. Brooks to apply
amounts received by the minor child as a result of his permanent
disability to his obligation to pay one-half of her private school
expenses.
he was

Mr. Brooks argued that without applying those payments,

financially

unable

to pay

expenses.
4

a portion

of private

school

Over all of Mr. Brooks1 objections, the Order Modifying Decree
of Divorce was entered by the court on October 2, 1992 wherein Mr,
Brooks is required to pay one-half of the minor child's private
school expenses without any credit for the child's Social Security
benefits and wherein judgment was entered against him in the amount
of $11,792.06 for arrearages in medical, dental and private school
expenses.

There were no post-judgment motions

filed, and Mr.

Brooks filed his Notice of Appeal on Monday, November 2, 1992.
Mrs. Brooks filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on November 13, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce

entered in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of
Los Angeles, on or about August 14, 1985. The parties were awarded
joint

legal and physical

custody of the parties' minor child,

Michelle Nohealani Brooks, born September 18, 1980.
tiff's Exhibit 6 and Trial

transcript p. 4.)

(See plain-

Mr. Brooks was

ordered to pay Mrs. Nunley child support in the amount of $300 per
month.

If the minor child resided with Mr. Brooks for sixteen or

more days in any month, Mrs. Nunley was ordered to pay Mr. Brooks
child

support

plaintiff's

in the

Exhibit

amount

6)

Mrs.

of

$100

Nunley

for that
was

month.

ordered

to

(See
pay

the

transportation expenses associated with Mr. Brooks' visitation.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 and Trial transcript p. 5)

Immediately

thereafter, Mrs. Nunley moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, and some
time later Mr. Brooks moved to

Montana.

5

(R. 3-15)

2.

On or about June 27, 1988, Mrs. Nunley filed her Petition

for Modification of Foreign Decree, wherein she requested an order
of court modifying the California Decree as it related to her
obligation to pay transportation costs associated with the minor
child's traveling from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles for visitation
with Mr. Brooks.

(R. 2-9)

At the time of entry of the Decree of

Divorce, Mrs. Nunley received free and/or discounted air travel
through her employment with TWA.

(R. 4)

She alleged that since

there were no TWA flights between Salt Lake City and Montana and
therefore no flight benefits, there had been a substantial change
of circumstances upon which the court should modify the Decree of
Divorce.
3.

(R. 5)
Mr. Brooks brought a counter-petition for modification

denying that Mrs. Nunley was entitled to the relief requested and
seeking an order requiring Mrs. Nunley to comply with the visitation provisions of the Decree and her obligation to pay the travel
expenses associated with that visitation.
4.

Pursuant

to stipulation

(R. 15-20)

of the parties,

(R. 44) the

plaintiff amended her Petition to Modify Foreign Decree on or about
November 23, 1988.

To the previous claim for relief, Mrs. Nunley

sought a court order requiring Mr. Brooks to pay for one-half of
Michelle's medical and dental expenses, one-half of private school
tuition, costs, and expenses and seeking a court order increasing
Mr. Brooks' child support of $300 per month under the California
Decree to an amount commensurate with the applicable child support
guidelines.

(R. 34-43)
6

5.

The case came on for trial on April 22, 1991-

6.

(R. 218)

At the time the parties were divorced, Mr. Brooks was

employed by the Los Angeles Police Department.

As of June, 1985,

Mr. Brooks was honorably and medically retired from the police
department.

(Trial transcript p. 84)

At the time of trial, Mr.

Brooks had a disease of the thyroid, an ulcer disease and a heart
disease.

(Trial transcript p. 87)

had a heart attack,

In January of 1991, Mr. Brooks

(Trial transcript p. 88) and he suffered from

post-traumatic stress syndrome resulting, at least in part, from
two work-related helicopter crashes.

(Trial transcript pp. 89-91)

At the time of trial, Mr. Brooks was
including

nitroglycerin,

Cortisone,

on numerous

Sinequan,

medications

Zanex,

Halcion,

Codeine and Fiovinal (Trial transcript p. 92).
7.

Mr. Brooks testified that the heart problem restricted

his ability

to work

(Trial transcript

p. 90), and his

income

consisted of $2,332.26 per month from the Los Angeles City Pension
Plan and $697.00 per month in Social Security disability benefits.
(See defendant's Exhibit 6.)
8.

Mrs. Nunley

attempted

to establish

that Mr. Brooks'

income was in excess of the $3,029.26 outlined above based upon, in
part, his ownership of a Ferrari automobile purchased in 1986 and
the significant deposits to his checking account from May 16 of
1988 to July 17 of 1990 in the amount of $173,650.68.

However, all

of these monies were accounted for by Mr. Brooks as follows:

7

BROOKS V. BROOKS
REBUTTAL OF ALLEGED DEFENDANT'S INCOME
Deposits to checking account (5/16/88 - 7/17/90)

$173,650.68

Less proceeds from defendant's sale of home
in Los Angeles

- 43,649.91

Less proceeds from defendant's second
mortgage loan from Ronnie Hansen

- 15,000.00

Less credit card advances (5/16/88 - 7/17/90)

- 17,687.59

Less loans from defendant's familyBrother
Father

- 2,025.50
- 23,000.00

Adjusted Balance (5/16/88 - 7/17/90)

Less Pension
5/88 to
8/88 to
8/89 to

Income
7/88 - 1,916.88 x 3
7/89 - 1,992.77 x 12
7/90 - 2,077.23 x 12

$ 72,287.68

- 5,750.64
- 23,913.24
- 24,926.76
$ 17,697.04

Less Pension adjustment check
Insurance payment
Security wages
Tax refunds
Trout (food reimbursement)
Insurance medicine (reimbursement)

Less 6/15/90 Pension adjustment check

(See Defendant's Exhibit 11)

8

-

4,000.00
3,462.00
789.00
750.00
1,051.00

$

7,646.04

-

5,346.23

$

2,299.81

9. Mrs. Nunley had voluntarily terminated her employment with
Delta Airlines in June of 1989, (Trial transcript pp. 13 and 13-21)
and

at

the

time

of

trial, she was

self-employed

designing,

manufacturing, and distributing costumes as Nunley, Inc. (Trial
transcript p. 15)
10.

Mrs. Nunley testified that she took no salary from the

business from 1989 through 1991 except $2,000 in 1989 and that all
monies received were reimbursement for expenses incurred. (Trial
transcript p. 16)

She was willing to stipulate that, for purposes

of calculating child support, her income was $800 per month.
(Trial transcript p. 17)
11.

The tax return filed by Nunley, Inc. in 1990 showed gross

receipts in the amount of $221,120.00 and a net profit of $4,493.00
on which the corporation was taxed.

(Defendant's Exhibit 12 and

Trial transcript p. 63)
12.

At the time of trial, Mrs. Nunley was receiving child

support in the amount of $300 per month.

In addition, Mrs. Nunley

was receiving Social Security disability payments for and on behalf
of the parties' minor child as a result of Mr. Brooks' disability.
She had received a lump sum payment of $6,000 and was receiving
$345.00 per month.

(Trial

transcript

pp.

55-56)

Mrs. Nunley

testified that she was not spending this money because she was
concerned that Social Security would recall it if they found out
Mr. Brooks was not really disabled.

(Trial transcript pp. 60-62)

Mrs. Nunley admitted she had no evidence to support her concern,
and that it was just a suspicion.
9

(Trial transcript p. 62)

13.

Mrs. Nunley and her second husband had historically earned

the following amounts:

(See Defendant's Exhibit 3)
BROOKS vs. BROOKS

SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S YEARLY INCOME JOINT TAX RETURNS
YEAR
1986 Joint Tax Return

SOURCE
Husband - W-2
Wife - W-2
Interest
Dividends
Refunds

TOTAL
$53,272, 00
$23,038, 00
$ 1,693, 00
$
652, 00
$ 1,919, 00
$80,574.00

1987 Tax Return

Husband - W-2
Wife - W-2
Interest
Refunds

$63,259.05
$38,499.95
$ 1,552.00
$ 1,272.00
$94,483.00

1988 Tax Return

Husband - W-2
Wife - W-2
Dividends
Refunds

$63,239.45
$26,020.55
$ 1,029.00
$
532.00
$90,821.00

1989 Tax Return

Husband - WWife - W-2
Interest
Dividends
Refund

$74, 797
$11, 299
399
$
$ 1 101
$ 1 649

00
00
00
00
00

$89,245.00

10

14.

During their marriage, the parties sent Michelle to a

private school in California called Westchester Lutheran School
when she was three and four years old.

(Trial Transcript p. 22)

Several weeks after the parties were divorced in August, 1985, Mrs.
Nunley remarried and moved to Salt Lake City where she enrolled
Michelle

at

Rowland

Hall-St.

Mark's

private

school.

(Trial

transcript p. 104)
15.

Mrs.

Nunley

unilaterally

made

the

decision

to

send

Michelle to private school in Utah without discussing it with Mr.
Brooks. (Trial transcript pp. 42-43 and 105-105)
Mrs.

Nunley

request

Mr. Brooks

pay

for

half

At no time did
of

the

expenses

associated therewith until her filing of the Amended Petition to
Modify in or about November, 1988.
16.

(Trial transcript p. 103-105)

Without credit for the disability payments being received

by Michelle, Mr. Brooks asserted he was financially unable to pay
a portion of Michelle's private school expenses.

(Transcript of

March 9, 1992 hearing pp. 5-9 and R. 780-786)
17.

After trial, the court entered its Minute Entry on or

about April 26, 1992 wherein, among other things, the court ruled
as follows:
a.

While

expressing

concern

that

neither

party

fully

disclosed their income, the court found that Mrs. Nunley's
current monthly income was $900.00 per month and Mr. Brooks'
monthly income was $3,029.00 per month.

The court denied Mrs.

Nunley's request for increased child support, finding that the
$300 required under the California Decree was in excess of the
11

$252 per month provided for pursuant to the Utah Child Support
Guidelines.
b,

The court ordered that the parties share equally in the

cost of transportation of the minor child for visitation, and
ordered Mrs. Nunley to reimburse Mr. Brooks for one-half of
his transportation costs reasonably incurred in exercising his
visitation rights.
c.

The court ordered each party to pay one-half

of the

private school tuition, books and supplies, school activities
and school uniforms of the minor child.

The court found that

this obligation should not extend to the child 1 s extracurricular activities.

The court ruled that the amount being paid to

Mrs. Nunley on behalf of the minor child by Social Security as
a result of Mr. Brooks' permanent disability should be applied
against his obligation to pay private school expenses.

The

court ordered that judgment be entered against the defendant
in an amount to reimburse the plaintiff for private school
costs incurred after giving Mr. Brooks this credit.
f.

Each party was ordered to pay their own attorney's fees

incurred in maintaining this action.
18.

(R. 221-227)

Thereafter, on or about June 6, 1991, Mrs. Nunley brought

a Motion for Clarification of Ruling and for In-Camera Interview.
In this motion, Mrs. Nunley alleged that the proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by Mr. Brooks' counsel did not
conform with the court's Minute Entry.

In addition, although

listing no details, Mrs. Nunley alleged that certain issues needed
12

to be clarified and that the court should conduct an in-camera
interview with the parties1

minor child with

respect

to

that

summer's visitation because the parties were unable to communicate
on the issue between themselves.
19.

(R. 292-294)

Mr. Brooks objected to Mrs. Nunley's motion, arguing in

favor of the proposed findings and conclusions submitted to Mrs.
Nunley's counsel and pointing out that her assertions as to issues
needing clarification were totally without support or specifics.
Finally, Mr. Brooks objected to the in-camera interview on the
basis that the issue of summer visitation was not properly before
the court.

He sought an award of attorney's fees for the necessity

of responding to the motion.
20.

(R. 302-305)

Mrs. Nunley filed a response to the effect that the motion

was necessary based upon the "grave differences" in the parties'
interpretation of the April 26, 1991 Minute Entry. (R. 306-308)
21.

Mrs. Nunley's Motion for Clarification came before the

court for oral argument on August 7, 1991.
hearing

is located at R. pp. 419-482)

(The transcript of this
After arguing

numerous

issues, the court decided to allow Mrs. Nunley to submit a motion
to amend the court's ruling pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code
of Judicial Administration on the following issues:
a.

Whether or not the court's ruling on application of

the minor child's

Social Security benefits to defendant's

obligation to pay private school costs was appropriate. (R.
459-460)

13

b.

The amounts paid by Mrs, Nunley for tuition, books,

activities and uniforms for private school for the minor child
for which she was seeking reimbursement. (R. 469-471)
c.

The court agreed that in his April 26th Minute Entry

the court had failed to address Mrs. Nunley1s claim for onehalf of medical expenses
child.

incurred

The court allowed her to submit additional evidence as

to her medical expenses incurred.
22.

on behalf of the minor

(R. 474-476)

The court specifically allowed counsel for Mr. Brooks

sufficient time to respond to plaintiff's motion to allow him to
conduct discovery on these issues if necessary.

The court granted

Mr. Brooks 30 days to respond, but in no event was he required to
respond sooner than September 6, 1991.
23.
the

(R. 459-461)

Counsel for Mr. Brooks expressly reserved his objection to

submission

of

additional

documentary

evidence

of

expenses

incurred by Mrs. Nunley on the basis that such evidence was not
timely presented at trial.

(R. 477)

24. Finally, at the August 9th hearing, the court ruled that
the expenses which each party was ordered to reimburse the other
would begin to accrue as of the date of the filing of the amended
petition, and not from the date of the Decree of Divorce.
25.

(R. 487)

When Mrs. Nunley failed to file this motion, to amend in

a timely manner, Mr. Brooks filed his Motion to Strike Plaintiff's
Reserved

Issues

from

Motion

for

Clarification,

Attorneys Fees on or about September 16, 1991.
388-382).

Sanctions

and

(R. 376-379 and

The court denied the motion on or about November 8, 1991.
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26.

Over the objections of Mr. Brooks, the court entered its

written order relating to the August 9th hearing prepared by Mrs.
Nunley1s attorney on or about December 3, 1991.
27.

(R. 737-746)

Prior to entry of this order on the rulings made in the

August hearing, counsel for Mrs. Nunley submitted her Motion for
Post-Trial Determination of Divorce Modification Issues on or about
November 1, 1991, almost two months after the time set forth by the
court for Mrs. Nunley to file the motion and for Mr. Liapis to
respond.

(R. 527)

Attached as Exhibit "C" to the motion was the

Affidavit of JoAnne Nunley to which was attached over one hundred
pages of purported documentation supporting her claim for one-half
of $47,490.95 in private school expenses.
as Exhibit
JoAnne

Attached

"D" to the plaintiff's motion was the Affidavit of

Nunley

expenses.

(R. 548-657)

relating

(R. 658)

to

her

claim

for

medical

and

dental

To this affidavit was attached fifty nine

pages of documentation to support Mrs. Nunley*s claim for one-half
of $2,994.00.
28.

On

Memorandum

(R. 658-720)
or about December

in Opposition

6,

1991, Mr. Brooks

to Plaintiff's

Motion

for

filed

his

Post-Trial

Determination of Divorce Modification Issues relating primarily to
the court's authority to apply Michelle's Social Security benefits
to Mr. Brooks' obligation to pay one-half of her private school
expenses.
29.

(R. 747-753)

On December 16, 1991, Mr. Brooks filed a supplement to his

primary memorandum

in opposition, (R. 777) and on December 17,

1991, Mr. Brooks filed his Answer to Plaintiff's Motion for Post15

trial Determination and in Support of his Motion for Attorneyfs
Fees.

(R. 780)

Among the defenses listed in these documents were

the following:
a.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (8)(b)

(1992) a court is given discretion in deciding whether or
not Social Security benefits received by a child due to
the earnings of a parent should

be credited

parent's child support obligation.

(R. 777)

b.

to that

Mr. Brooks argued that Mrs. Nunley's motion for

determination of post-trial issues was barred by the fact
that she did not submit the evidence at time of trial.
c.

Should the court change its decision relating to

application of Michelle's Social Security benefits to Mr.
Brooks1 obligation to pay private school expenses, then
Mr.

Brooks

requested

the

court

receive

and

evaluate

additional evidence and make a finding relating to his
financial

inability

to

pay

private

school

expenses

without such credit and vacate its order requiring him to
do so.
30.

The plaintiff made motions to strike the supplement and

answer filed by Mr. Brooks

(R. 759 and R. 788) which the court

granted. (R. 798)
31.

The court entered its Minute Entry dated December 19, 1991

wherein it granted Mrs. Nunley's motion for post-trial determination of modification issues without any evidentiary hearing.
796)

(R.

In so doing, the court vacated its Order of April 26, 1991
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allowing the defendant a credit for amounts paid to Michelle as a
result of his disability.
entered

The court ordered that judgment be

against the defendant

in the amount of

$13,360.75

for

private school costs and expenses and in the amount of $805.23 for
medical and dental expenses.
32.

(R. 798)

On or about December 31, 1991 Mr. Brooks filed his Motion

for Ruling on Omitted Issues, Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and
Argument of Court's Minute Entry, Motion for a New Trial and Other
Related Matters.

This motion was based in large part upon the

court's consideration of evidence not submitted at trial without
allowing a hearing wherein Mr. Brooks would be allowed to crossexamine Mrs. Nunley on the evidence presented and make objections
thereto.

Mr. Brooks also pointed out that the court failed to rule

on his request to reconsider its order requiring him to pay onehalf of private school tuition and expenses in the event the court
reversed its ruling allowing Mr. Brooks credit for Social Security
benefits received by Michelle towards those expenses. Finally, Mr.
Brooks argued

that the plethora of documents

attached

to Mrs.

Nunley's affidavits were hearsay and therefore inadmissible.

(R.

800-812)
33.

Mr. Brooks also filed a Motion to Amend Judgment, and in

the Alternative, for Relief from Judgment or Order on or about
January

10, 1992, as well

as an objection

to the

plaintiff's

proposed order on the motion for post-trial determination
and a motion for oral argument.

(R. 828)

Mrs. Nunley objected to all of the
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foregoing, and in its Minute Entry: dated January 21, 1992, the
court denied all motions without hearing.
34.

(R. 850-852)

Thereafter, each party prepared proposed Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, and each
objected to the otherfs proposed documents.

(R. 878)

The court

heard the argument of the parties relating to the objections on
March 9, 1992.

(A copy of this transcript is found in the same

bound volume as the trial transcript.)

The court again heard

argument relating to whether or not the court should make a finding
relating to Mr. Brooks1 ability to pay private school expenses and
whether or not he should have been allowed cross-examination on the
documents submitted by Mrs. Nunley relating to those expenses (See
transcript of March 9th hearing, p. 21.)

The parties agreed to sit

down and discuss an accounting of amounts due under the court's
ruling, and the court agreed to consider whether or not Mr. Brooks
was

financially

able to pay

such expenses.

(Tr. of March

9th

hearing pp. 46-47 and see Court's Minute Entry at R. 911)
35.

Mr.

accounting

Brooks

on May

submitted

his

response

to

15, 1992 wherein Mr. Brooks

Mrs.

stipulated

certain amounts would be due under the court's ruling.
agreed

that

the

amounts

assessable

against

Nunley f s

the

that

The parties

defendant

for

private school expenses totaled $10,158.62, and that Mrs. Nunley
owed to the defendant the amount of $1,813.25 for one-half of the
travel costs incurred by him.

Therefore, Mr. Brooks owed to the

plaintiff the amount of $8,345.37.

(R. 925)

In addition to these

accounting issues, Mr. Brooks argued in this responsive motion that
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his share of private school tuition and expenses

for the next

school year would total $3,308.73, and that he was unable to afford
payment of $300 per month as child support, payment of arrearages
in the amount of over $8,000, as well as his share of expenses for
the year 1992-1993 in excess of $3,000.

(R. 926)

Finally, Mr.

Brooks set forth the remaining items claimed by Mrs. Nunley to
which he objected on the basis that they were either incurred prior
to the filing of the amended petition and therefore inappropriate
or were

items which

support.

should be covered

from

his monthly

child

(R. 927)

36.

Mrs. Nunley filed her response and objection on May 20,

1992 which

included

a

claim

for

amounts

paid

for

Michelle's

extracurricular activities in addition to private school expenses
and costs.
37.

(R. 989-1028)

In the court's Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992 the court

found that Mr. Brooks owed to Mrs. Nunley the sum of $8,312.75 for
private school tuition and costs; the sum of $578.62 as his share
of medical, dental
$2,900.69

as

and

additional

prescription
charges

for

expenses; and
uniforms,

the

sum of

activities

and

supplies. (R. 1040)
38.

Over the objection of the defendant, the court entered its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Modifying Decree of
Divorce on October 2, 1992.

(A copy of each is attached to this

brief as Exhibit A and they are, by reference, made a part hereof)
The Order granted Mrs. Nunley judgment in the amount of $11,792.06,
and it denied Mr. Brooks credit for the Social Security benefits
19

received by Michelle.

(R. 1051-1075)

Mr. Brooks filed his Notice

of Appeal on Monday, November 2, 1992.

(R. 1099)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

It was an abuse of discretion for the court to modify the

Decree of Divorce between these parties to require Mr. Brooks to
pay a portion of the minor child's private school expenses without
finding that there had been a material and substantial change of
circumstances warranting such modification.

Instead, the evidence

is clear that there was no change of circumstances sufficient to
warrant the modification, and this court should vacate the lower
court's order.
2.

Based upon the overwhelming evidence submitted in this

case and based upon the court's finding that Mr. Brooks had a
monthly income of $3,029.00, it was an abuse of discretion for the
court to find that Mr. Brooks had a financial
$300.00 per month

ability

to pay

in child support, over $3000.00 per year in

private school expenses, and amounts to satisfy a judgment for
arrearages

for private

school, medical

and

dental

expenses

in

excess of $11,000.00.
3.

The court erred as a matter of law in holding that it did

not have the legal authority to apply Social Security benefits
received by the minor child as a result of Mr. Brooks' disability
to his obligation to pay a portion of her private school expenses.
Instead, the court is empowered to do so by statute and pursuant to
case law.

This court should enter its order allowing Mr. Brooks a

credit towards his obligation for amounts received by Michelle
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should

it

determine

that

the

lower

court

did

not

abuse

its

discretion in ordering him to pay a portion of her private school
expenses.
4.

It was an abuse of discretion for the court to consider

documentary evidence submitted by Mrs. Nunley over six months after
trial to establish amounts incurred by her from the date of the
filing of her petition to modify to the time of trial for the minor
child's

medical,

dental

and

private

school

expenses

without

allowing Mr. Brooks the opportunity for a hearing to cross-examine
Mrs. Nunley on this evidence and make objections thereto.

This

court should remand this case for a hearing on the evidence should
it hold that the lower court did not abuse its discretion

in

ordering Mr. Brooks to pay a portion of Michelle's private school
expenses.
ARGUMENTS
I

IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR
THE COURT TO MODIFY THE DECREE OF
DIVORCE TO REQUIRE MR. BROOKS TO PAY
ONE-HALF OF THE MINOR CHILD'S PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES, AND TO ENTER
JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM FOR ONE-HALF OF
SUCH EXPENSES PREVIOUSLY INCURRED

In order to prevail

on a petition

to modify a decree of

divorce, the party seeking the relief must establish that, as a
threshold requirement, there has been a material and substantial
change in circumstances occurring since entry of the decree of
divorce.

(See

Utah

Code

Ann.
21

§

78-45-7

(1992)

Woodward

v.

Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985); Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d
330 (Utah 1985); and Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1985).)
The provisions of the original Decree of Divorce between these
parties which Mrs. Nunley sought to modify related to responsibility

for payment of the transportation costs of visitation, the

amount of Mr. Brooks1 child support obligation, responsibility for
ongoing
expenses

payment

of

and

reimbursement

for

medical

and

dental

incurred on behalf of the minor child not covered by

insurance, and responsibility for ongoing payment of and reimbursement for one-half of all costs and expenses associated with the
minor child's private school and extra-curricular activities.
While the court expressly found that there had been a material
and substantial

change of circumstances relating to modification

of the Decree relating to payment of the child's transportation
costs, the court also expressly found there had been no substantial
and material change of circumstances in the financial condition of
the parties to justify an increase in Mr. Brooks' child support
obligation.

(See Finding of Fact No. 16 at R. 1058-59 and Finding

of Fact No. 10 at R. 1056-57)

The court made no specific finding

whatsoever with respect to whether or not there was a change of
circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification requiring Mr.
Brooks to pay one-half of Michelle's private school expenses.
To begin with, this failure to make such a finding constitutes
reversible

error

"unless

the

facts

in the

record

are

'clear,

uncontroverted and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of
the judgment.'"

Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 at 425 (Utah App.
22

1990)

In this case, the facts are capable of supporting only a

finding contrary to the court's ruling,

Michelle attended private

school for at least two years prior to entry of the original Decree
of Divorce, and began private school in Utah within weeks thereafter.

Therefore, there was no substantial change in Michelle's

circumstances.

Secondly, the court did find that there was no

material or substantial change in the income of the parties to
warrant an increase in Mr. Brook's child support obligation.

It

would clearly follow that there was no change in the financial
circumstances of the parties sufficient to warrant a modification
requiring him to pay the private school expenses.
As a result, the record is clear that Mrs. Nunley simply could
not satisfy the threshold requirement necessary for the court to
grant her the relief requested.

This court should make such a

finding and vacate the lower court's order requiring Mr. Brooks to
pay a portion of Michelle's

private

school

expenses.

In the

alternative, this court should vacate the order and remand the case
for specific findings relating to whether or not there has been a
substantial

and material change of circumstances

sufficient to

warrant the modification at issue.
Even if there had been a sufficient change of circumstances
warranting an order requiring Mr. Brooks to pay private school
expenses, the court's finding that he had the financial ability to
do so is contrary to the evidence and an abuse of discretion.
Finding No. 30 at R. 1063)

(See

It is clear under the law that a court

must consider a parent's financial ability to pay child support and
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amounts in excess of a basic child support obligation prior to
making such orders.

Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Civil Liability

for Support Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1, et seq., an obligor
parent's child support obligation is based on the parties' gross
monthly

income

from all but a few enumerated

sources.

The

guidelines are, of course, rebuttable, but in order to avoid their
application, a court must make specific findings which relate to
the obligor parent's financial circumstances.

Pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3):
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the
guidelines, the court shall establish support after
considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the standard of living and situation of the parties;
the relative wealth and income of the parties;
the ability of the obligor to earn;
the ability of the obligee to earn;
the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
the ages of the parties; and
the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee
for the support of others.

In addition, although there is no case law on point in the
State of Utah, other states which have analyzed whether or not an
obligor parent must pay a portion of private school expenses in
addition to a base child support amount, have uniformly held that
one major factor for the court to consider is the ability of the
obligor parent to pay such expenses.

For example, in the case of

Hardisty v. Hardisty, 439 A.2d 307 (Conn. 1981), the Supreme Court
of Connecticut

was

faced with

this

issue

in

a modification

proceeding. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that:
'[C]ourts have the power to direct one or both
parents to pay for private schooling, if the
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circumstances warrant. It is a matter to be
determined in the sound discretion of the
court on consideration of the totality of the
circumstances including the financial ability
of the parties, the availability of public
schools, the schools attended by the children
prior to the divorce, and the special needs
and general welfare of the children.f
Id. at 312.

(Citing Cleveland v. Cleveland, 161 Conn. 452, 461,

289 A.2d 909 (1971).)

(A copy of the Hardisty case is attached to

this brief as Exhibit B)
Given the wide discretion vested in trial courts in the State
of Utah in fashioning equitable orders in domestic disputes, it
would

follow that Utah would also adopt a standard wherein the

trial court is required to look at all relevant facts and circumstances in determining whether a parent should be compelled to pay
for a portion of a child's private school expenses.
Applying the Hardisty factors to the facts of this case, there
was absolutely no evidence before the court as to the availability
and quality of public schools and any special needs or requirements
by Michelle to attend private school.

However, as is clear from

the record, Mr. Brooks is simply financially unable to do so.
The court appropriately

found that Mr. Brooks had a gross

monthly income of $3,029.00 from his pension and social security
benefits. Mrs. Nunley argued that Mr. Brooks had the ability to
earn more and that his purchase of a Ferrari in 1986, his purchase
of a home in Montana, and the large deposits
account

established

he

did

supports the court's finding.

so.

However,

the

to his
record

checking
clearly

The purchase of the car had been

five years prior to trial in this matter, and Mr. Brooks accounted
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for all of the deposits to his account as outlined in his Exhibit
11.

The deposits consisted primarily of proceeds from the sale of

Mr. Brooks' home in Los angeles, loans and his Social Security and
pension payments.
Despite

Mrs.

Nunley's

allegations

to

the

contrary,

the

testimony was essentially uncontroverted that Mr. Brooks suffered
from thyroid, ulcer and heart diseases and that he had a heart
attack in January of 1991.

He testified that, at the time of

trial, there was a medical restriction on his becoming actively
employed.

Mr. Brooks further testified that he was suffering from

post-traumatic stress syndrome, resulting at least in part from two
helicopter crashes from which he suffered both mental and physical
difficulties.

At the time of trial, he was on numerous medications

including nitroglycerin, Cortisone, Sinequan, Zanex, Halicion and
Codeine and Fiorinal.

Therefore, he was unable to find private

employment to earn in excess of the amounts he received from his
pension and in disability benefits although he had earned extra
income in the past.
Finally, despite the fact that the parties have joint physical
custody

of Michelle, Mrs. Nunley's

private school was a unilateral one.

decision

to

enroll

her

in

At no time did Mrs. Nunley

discuss the issue with Mr. Brooks, and he was allowed no input
prior to the decision being made for Michelle.

(Trial tr. pp. 42-

43)

This is contrary to a joint custody arrangement where parents

are

obliged

to

exchange

information

and

confer

health, education and welfare of their children.
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regarding

the

(See Utah Code

Ann. § 30-3-10.3(2) (b) (Supp. 1992).)

Further, at no time did Mrs.

Nunley request or make demand that Mr. Brooks pay for a portion of
Michelle's private school expenses until she filed her Amended
Petition for Modification in November, 1988, three years after her
decision to enroll Michelle in private school.
Based on all of the foregoing and the court's finding that Mr.
Brooks' gross monthly income totalled $3,029.00 per month, it was
an abuse of discretion to find that Mr. Brooks had the financial
ability to pay $300.00 per month in child support, ongoing private
school

expenses

of

over

$3,000.00

per

year,

and

arrearages

totalling $11,792.06. This court should modify the finding, vacate
the

court's

order

requiring

Mr. Brooks

to pay private

school

expenses, and vacate the judgment for arrearages entered against
him.

Instead, this court should enter its order denying Mrs.

Nunley!s claim that Mr. Brooks should pay a portion of Michelle's
private school expenses.

THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW MR. BROOKS
CREDIT TOWARD HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY
ONE-HALF
OF
MICHELLE'S
PRIVATE
SCHOOL EXPENSES FOR AMOUNTS SHE
RECEIVES FROM SOCIAL SECURITY AS A
RESULT OF HIS DISABILITY
Throughout this action, Mr. Brooks has taken the position that
he is financially unable to pay for a portion of Michelle's private
school

expenses

unless

the

court

allows

him

to

offset

those

expenses with monies received by Mrs. Nunley on Michelle's behalf
from

Social

Security

as

a

result
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of

Mr.

Brooks'

disability.

Originally, in his Minute Entry dated April 26, 1991, the court
allowed just such an offset.

Subsequently, the court agreed to

reconsider this issue, and Mrs. Nunley filed her Motion for PostTrial Determination of Divorce Modification issues.
In so doing, Mrs. Nunley

relied

(R. 527)

on the provisions

of 42

U.S.C.A. § 407(a) which state that payments of this type are not
transferrable or assignable and are not subject to execution, levy,
attachment,

garnishment,

or

other

legal

process,

operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.

or

to

the

Mrs. Nunley further

relied on a letter written by Francis R. Darr, a Service Representative for the Social Security Administration

(R. 544) which in

essence described the nature of the benefits being received by
Michelle and outlined

the priority

for their use as being: 1)

shelter; 2) food; 3) medical and personal needs; and 4) the support
of legally dependent family members.
Mr. Brooks argued, among other things, that § 407 does not
apply to bar the credit and that the concerns raised by Ms. Darr
were inaplicable because Mr. and Mrs. Nunley had earned anywhere
from $80,000.00 to $94,000.00 per year from 1986 through 1989 and
all of Michelle's basic needs were completely

satisfied.

He

further relied on Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7.5 (1992) which expressly
gives the court discretion in determining

whether to apply such

benefits to a parent's child support obligation.
Mrs. Nunley's motion on the issue, reversed

The court granted

its ruling made

on

April 26th and denied Mr. Brooks credit for the benefits received
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by Michelle on the basis that the court believed it did not have
the authority to order the offset.
However, the court erred as a matter of law in reaching this
conclusion, and this court can review the lower court's decision
for correctness without any special deference.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 1991).)
407

is

completely

inapplicable

Instead, § 407 applies

to

to

protect

(See Howell v.

To begin with, 42 USCA

situations
a debtor's

such
Social

as

this.

Security

disability benefits from the distraint action of creditors so that
the debtor has sufficient income with which to meet his most basic
needs.

This is not the issue here.

Further, even where a creditor

seeks to attach such benefits, courts have held that § 407 is
inapplicable if the debtor can satisfy his basic needs.

As argued

by Mr. Brooks and as outlined by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in the case of United States v. Devalle, 704 F.2d

1513

(11th Cir. 1983):
By insulating Social Security benefits from
assignment or seizure, § 407 attempts to
ensure that recipients have the resources
necessary to meet their most basis needs. . .
Thus, when the assignment has the effect of
denying the debtor basic resources, Section
407 is properly invoked. . . . However, when
the debtor's ability to care for himself or
herself is not implicated, Section 407 need
not be applied.
Id. at 1516-17.

(citations omitted, emphasis added)

Recognition of the inapplicability of § 407 is reflected in
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(8)(b) (1992).

Section 7 8-45-7.5 relates

to determination of gross income for purposes of computing child
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support pursuant

to the child

support guidelines.

Subsection

(8)(b) states as follows:
Social Security benefits received by a child
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose
earning record it is based, by crediting the
amount against the potential obligation of
that parent. Other unearned income of a child
may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
Clearly, given the inapplicability of § 407 and the clear and
unambiguous language of this statute, it was error as a matter of
law for the court to conclude that it simply did not have the
authority to credit Mr. Brooks with the Social Security disability
benefits received by Michelle.
This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion reached by
the courts of an overwhelming majority of the states, even those
without express

statutory

authority upon which

to rely.

Most

recently, the issue came before the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
the case of Pontbriand v. Pontbriand, 622 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1993).

(A

copy of the Pontbriand case is attached to this brief as Exhibit C)
In holding that an obligor parentfs child support obligation may be
offset by Social Security benefits paid to dependent children on
behalf of that parent, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated:
The rationale for allowing a credit is
perhaps best stated by a recent Indiana
decision on the issue. 'The rationale is that
the
social
security
benefits
are
not
gratuities but are earned, and they substitute
for
lost earning
power because
of
the
disability.'
Id. at 485.

(citing Poynter v. Poynter, 590 N.E.2d

(Ind. Ct. App. 1992).)
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150 at 152

The Rhode Island

Supreme Court went on to emphasize that

equity and fairness require such a result because the benefits paid
to the children are funds earned by the obligor parent.
the

Supreme

Court

of Vermont, the Rhode

Island

Quoting

Supreme

Court

stated:
'Equity and fairness demand that consideration
be given to government child support benefits
paid to the party having custody.
These
payments are, in a sense, a substitute for
wages the obligor would have received but for
the disability, and from which the court
ordered payments would otherwise have been
made. In theory, at least, the actual source
of payments is of no concern to the party
having custody as long as they are in fact
made.'
Id. at 485.

(quoting Davis v. Davis, 141 Vt. 398 at 401, 449 A.2d

947 at 948 (1982).) (emphasis in original)
Finally, not only should such payments be applied to a support
obligation, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that to require an
obligor parent to seek a formal modification of a decree to claim
such a credit is overly harsh and that the credit should instead be
automatic after notification by the obligor parent that the support
would be met through a different source.
A similar theory was relied on by the Supreme Court of Kansas
in the case of Andler v. Andler, 217 Kan. 539, 538 P.2d 649 (1975).
In reversing

a lower

court's

decision

refusing

to allow

credit, the Kansas Supreme Court stated:
Social Security benefits paid to the appellee
for the benefit of the parties1 minor children
as the result of the appellant's disability
may not, however, be regarded as gratuitous.
On the contrary, the payments received by the
appellee are for the children as beneficiaries
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such

of an insurance policy. The premiums for such
policy were paid by the appellant for the
childrenfs benefit.
The purpose of Social
Security is the same as that of an insurance
policy with a private carrier, wherein a
father insures against his possible future
disability and loss of gainful employment by
providing for the fulfillment of his moral and
legal obligations to his children.
This
tragedy having occurred, the insurer has paid
out benefits to the beneficiaries under its
contract of insurance with the appellant, and
the purpose has been accomplished.
538 P.2d at 653.
Many other courts agree, and Mr. Brooks would refer this court
to the following cases:

Windham v. Alabama, 574 So.2d 853, 17 FLR

1130 (Ala Ct. Civ. App. 1990); Cash v. Cash, 353 SW.2d 348 (Ark.
Sup. Ct. 1962); Lopez v. Lopez, 609 P.2d 579 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980);
In re Denny, 171 Cal. Rptr. 440, 7 FLR 2314 (Ct. of App. 1981);
Perteet v. Sumner, 269 SE.2d 453 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1980); Newman v.
Newman,

451

NW.2d

843,

16

FLR

1197

(Iowa

Sup.

Ct.

1990);

Childerson v. Hess, 555 N.E.2d 1070 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Poynter
v.

Poynter,

590 N.E.2d

150

(Ind. Ct. App.

1992);

McCloud

v.

McCloud, 544 So.2d 764 (La. Ct. App. 1989);
Frens v. Frens, 478 N.W.2d 750, 18 FLR 1206 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991);
Mooneyham v. Mooneyham, 420 So.2d 1072, 9 FLR 2124 (Miss. Supt. Ct.
1982); Weaks v. Weaks, 821 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1991); Hanthorn
v. Hanthorn. 460 N.W.2d 650 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1990); Griffin v. Avery,
424 A.2d 175, 7 FLR 2226 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1980); Romero v. Romero,
682 P.2d 201 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Guthmiller v. Guthmiller, 448
N.W.2d 643, 16 FLR 1064 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1989); Davis v. Davis, 449
A.2d 947 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1982)
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Allowing a parent credit for disability benefits received by
a minor child is the more reasoned approach, and coupled with Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(8)(b) clearly establishes that the lower
court in this case erred, as a matter of law, in basing its order
on a belief that the court did not have authority to grant a credit
to Mr. Brooks for the disability benefits received by Michelle.
fact, in this case, this conclusion is even more compelling.
Brooks

is

not

attempting

to

offset

his

basic

child

In
Mr.

support

obligation in any way, and in fact stipulated to continue paying
$300 per month despite the fact that pursuant to the Child Support
Guidelines, his obligation would only be $252 per month.

He simply

seeks credit toward payment of an expense which for many people is
a luxury item.

Further, it was clear from the evidence before the

court that there is no issue as to whether Michelle's basic food
and

shelter needs are being met.

Mr. and Mrs. Nunley

earned

anywhere from $80,000 to $94,000 per year from 1986 through 1989.
As a result, if this court finds it was not an abuse of
discretion to order Mr. Brooks to pay a portion of Michellefs
private school expenses, then this court should vacate that portion
of the Order modifying the Decree of Divorce that denies Mr. Brooks
the credit at issue and enter its own order allowing him to offset
his

obligation

with

the

Social

Security

benefits

Michelle as a result of his disability.
Ill
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING MRS. NUNLEY TO SUBMIT
EVIDENCE AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF
TRIAL TO ESTABLISH AMOUNTS CLAIMED
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received

by

Two of the primary issues at trial in this case were Mrs.
Nunley's claim that Mr. Brooks should be ordered to pay one-half of
Michellefs private school expenses and one-half of her medical and
dental expenses not covered by insurance and that she be awarded
judgment against Mr. Brooks for amounts which had accrued prior to
trial.

Even so, there was absolutely no documentary

evidence

submitted by Mrs. Nunley at the time of trial which would establish
amounts she had paid for which she was seeking reimbursement.

In

fact, the only evidence at trial presented by Mrs. Nunley with
respect

to

Plaintiff's

Michelle's
Exhibit

private

5.

This

school
exhibit

expenses
listed

is

found

Michelle's

at

total

private school expenses per year to be $7,350.00, including extra
curricular activities of $1,775.00.

The only evidence relating to

medical and dental expenses incurred was testimony elicited from
Mrs. Nunley on cross- examination.
seeking

one-half

of

a

$200.00

She testified that she was
deductible

and

one-half

of

approximately $200.00 in medical bills. While she did not remember
off-hand, she believed that Michelle's orthodontial work was in
excess of $3000.00 or $4000.00.

(See Trial transcript p. 58.)

It was not until November 1, 1991, over six month's after
trial, that Mrs. Nunley submitted over one hundred and fifty pages
of documents purporting to establish her claim that judgment should
be entered against Mr. Brooks

in the amount of $13,360.75

for

private school expenses and in the amount of $805.23 for medical
and dental expenses.
court

refused

Despite Mr. Brooks' repeated requests, the

to conduct

a hearing
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wherein

he would

have

an

opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. Nunley on the documents presented
and make objections thereto.
The court's refusal was an abuse of discretion.

Rule 43 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the taking of evidence in
trials and on motions.

In all trials, the courts are required to

take testimony of witnesses orally and in open court pursuant to
Rule 43(a).

Rule 43(b) addresses the issue of when a matter should

be heard which is presented by motion.

It states as follows:

(b) Evidence on Motions. When a motion is
based on facts not appearing of record the
court may hear the matter on affidavits
presented by the respective parties, but the
court may direct that the matter be heard
wholly
or partly on oral testimony
or
depositions.
While this provision grants to a lower court the discretion to
determine

whether

or

not

to conduct

a hearing

and

take

oral

testimony, the Utah Supreme Court has held that when disputed
material facts are alleged in opposition to a motion, there should
be an evidentiary hearing to resolve those issues.

Specifically,

in Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d

1142

1977), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We recognize that Rule 43(e) allows the
District Court to grant or deny a motion on
the sole or combined bases of affidavits,
depositions or oral testimony. However, when
no depositions have been taken and disputed
material
facts
are alleged
in
opposing
affidavits, there should be an evidentiary
hearing to aid in the resolution of those
facts.
The
reasons
for
requiring
an
evidentiary hearing under the circumstances
were enunciated in Autera v. Robinson, 136
U.S. App.D.C. 216, 419 F.2nd 1197, 1202
(1969) , as follows:
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(Utah

'Had no factual dispute arisen to plague the
parties1 substantive rights, we would perceive
no difficulty in the judgefs acceptance as a
predicate for his action, of the facts
represented through statements by members of
the bar and affidavits of the parties or
others.
In this case, however, despite the
factual questions developing as the hearing
moved along, no opportunity was afforded
anyone to test any representation by the
chastening process of cross-examination . . .
The opportunity to judge credibility was
non-existent as to the absent affiants; the
opportunity to probe by cross-examination was
completely lacking. Without these twin tools,
normal in the trial of factual issues, the
factual conclusion was certain to take on an
unaccustomed quality of artificiality . . . We
recognize, of course, that trial judges have a
discretion to hear and determine ordinary
motions either on affidavits or oral testimony
portraying facts not appearing of record. We
note, however, that an attempted resolution of
factual disputes on conflicting affidavits
alone may pose the question whether the
discretion was properly exercised.f
565 P. 2d at 1143.

(Although the Utah Supreme Court cited Rule

43(e) and not 43(b), the court quoted the provisions of 43(e) in
footnote no. 2, and it is identical to the current language of Rule
43(b))
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

concluded

that

"where

a

crucial

conflict arises, as in this case, the matter should be resolved by
depositions

or an evidentiary hearing so that the factors

for

testing representations of witnesses as found in Autera, supra,
[are utilized]"

IcL_ at 1144.

This principle is further embodied in Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration which allows a party to request a
hearing "where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or

any

issues

in

the

action

on
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the

merits

with

prejudice."

Pursuant to 4-501(3)(c), the court must grant the request unless
the

motion

is

frivolous

or

the

issues

have

already

been

authoritatively decided.
Applying these principals to the facts of this case, the lower
court abused

its discretion

in failing to allow Mr. Brooks an

evidentiary hearing on expenses claimed by Mrs. Nunley and to allow
the opportunity for cross-examination.

To begin with, none of the

documents produced in her Motion for Determination for Post-Trial
Issues was submitted to Mr. Brooks in the course of discovery in
this case, and none of it was presented at trial in April of 1991.
No reason was offered for Mrs. Nunley's failure to timely

present

the evidence, and it was not submitted to the court or Mr. Brooks
until six months after trial.
In

a

written

memoranda,

Mr.

Brooks

set

forth

numerous

objections to the timeliness of the submission of evidence and
argued it should be barred by Mrs. Nunley's failure to submit it at
trial.

Mr.

themselves.

Brooks
These

also

raised

included

the

objections
following:

to
1)

the

documents

some of

the

documents had absolutely no reference to the date the expense was
purportedly incurred by Mrs. Nunley;

2)

certain of the documents

which did have dates placed those expenses at a time prior to Mrs.
Nunley's

filing of her Amended Petition to Modify despite

the

court1 s order that she was entitled to reimbursement only from that
day forward; 3)

certain of the documents were illegible; and (4)

there was no evidence with respect to whether or not medical and
dental expenses had been submitted to an insurance carrier and what
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portion, if any, had been paid the carrier.

(R. 777 through 786)

These objections and defenses raise what the Utah Supreme Court
defined as a "crucial conflict" in the Stan Katz Real Estate case,
supra, and the issues should have been resolved by an evidentiary
hearing

so that the representations

could be submitted

to the

"chastening process of cross-examination" and the opportunity to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Mrs.

Nunley will

argue

that

the document

in which

these

defenses were raised was not timely filed by Mr. Brooks and was
therefore

appropriately

stricken

by

the

court.

However,

the

court's granting Mrs. Nunley's motion to strike this memorandum was
an abuse of discretion and

contrary

to the

law of this case.

Previously, the court allowed Mrs. Nunley an opportunity to submit
documentary evidence on primary issues of this case despite the
fact that she failed to do so at time of trial.

In addition, at

the August 9, 1991 hearing when the court agreed to allow Mrs.
Nunley an opportunity to submit her motion to amend pursuant to
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the court
anticipated that the motion would be filed prior to the end of the
month.

Counsel for Mr. Brooks was expressly given 30 days within

which to respond to Mrs. Nunleyfs motion, with the caveat that his
response would be due no sooner than September 6, 1991.
Mrs.

Nunleyfs

motion

was

not

filed

until

November

Even so,
1,

1991.

Although the motion was not timely made, the court denied Mr.
Brooks' motion to strike it on that basis.
Given

the

seriousness

of

the

issues
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(R. 376-379 and R. 732)
and

given

the

court's

willingness to allow Mrs. Nunley to submit evidence and motions in
an untimely fashion, it was an abuse of discretion to strike a
response by Mr. Brooks raising legitimate objections and defenses.
Based upon the foregoing, if this court does not alter Mr.
Brooks1 obligation to pay private school expenses, then this court
should vacate the judgment against Mr. Brooks for past due medical
and dental expenses and private school expenses and remand the
issue of arrearages for a full evidentiary hearing before the trial
court.
CONCLUSION
It was an abuse of discretion for the lower court to modify
the Decree of Divorce in this case to require Mr. Brooks to pay a
portion of Michellefs private school expenses. The evidence in the
record is clear and there can be only two conclusions:

1)

there

was no substantial change of circumstances entitling Mrs. Nunley to
this modification; and 2)

Mr. Brooks does not have the financial

ability to pay such expenses.

This court should simply vacate the

order in this regard and enter its own order denying Mrs. Nunley's
claim.

In the alternative, should this court uphold the order

requiring Mr. Brooks to pay a portion of Michelle's private school
expenses, it should enter its own order granting Mr. Brooks credit
towards his obligation for Social Security benefits received by
Michelle as a result of his disability.

Finally, if Mr. Brooks is

to be responsible for arrearages in medical, dental and private
school expenses, then he is entitled to a hearing to determine the
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amount of those arrearages and his financial ability to satisfy the
obligation, and these issues should be remanded accordingly.
Dated this

day of June, 1993.
LIAPIS, GRAY, STEGALL & GREEN

Kim M.
Attorneys for Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee

DELIVERY CERTIF
I hereby certify that on this

day of June, 1993, I

caused to be hand delivered two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Defendant-Appellant to:
Randall J. Holmgren
Attorney at Law
The Valley Tower, Suite 1111
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054
Attorney at Law
The Valley Tower, Suite 1111
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 328-4333
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY),
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS M. BROOKS,
Defendant.

;
;
]
)
]
)

Case No. C 88 4192
Judge Richard H. Moffat

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiffs "Amended Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce" and Defendant's
"Countermotion" came on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of April, 1991 before the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat.

Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through her

attorney of record, Randall J. Holmgren. Defendant appeared in person and by and
through his attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis. The Court heard the sworn testimony of
Plaintiff and Defendant, marked and received documents and exhibits in support of the
positions of Plaintiff and Defendant, heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the records and

files herein and, took the matter under advisement and thereafter issued its Minute Entry
on the 26th day of April, 1991.
Following the issuance of said Minute Entry, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Clarification of Ruling and Defendant filed a Countermotion for Attorney Fees. Defendant
submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court on or about June
3, 1991, and Plaintiff objected to those proposed Findings and Conclusions and submitted
her own proposed Findings of Fact (with footnotes indicating the portions of the Court's
April 26, 1991 Minute Entry and Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact needing
clarification). The Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification and the Defendant's Countermotion
for Attorney Fees were heard on August 7, 1991.
The Court entered an Order (Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Ruling and
Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney Fees) on December 3, 1991. In said Order,
portions of the April 26, 1991 Minute Entry were clarified and other portions were reserved
for further review. In particular, said Order directed Plaintiff to submit a motion and
supporting memorandum to the Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, addressing the issues that the Court reserved for further review. The Court
directed that entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Divorce Modification
Order be delayed until such time as such post-trial motion was submitted and ruled on so
that the issues thereby resolved, together with the issues clarified by the December 3, 1991

2

Order, could be included in the final Findings, Conclusions, and modification of decree
Order pertaining to the April 22, 1991.
On or about November 1, 1991, Plaintiff submitted her "Motion for Post-Trial
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues," as directed by the Court. The Motion was
opposed by Defendant. The matter was submitted to the Court in accordance with Rule 4501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Court issued a Minute Entry ruling
dated December 19, 1991 and entered an "Order (Re: Motion for Post-Trial Determination
of Divorce Modification Issues)" on January 10, 1992.
On or about March 6, 1992, upon the request of the Defendant, the Court instructed
Plaintiff and Defendant to submit an accounting to the Court with respect to the amounts
expended by Plaintiff on behalf of the parties' minor child, Michelle, for private school,
tuition, books, uniforms, school supplies and school activities, and medical, dental and
prescription expenses.

Accordingly, on or about May 15, 1992, Defendant submitted

"Defendant's Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request." On or about May 19,
1992, Plaintiff submitted "Plaintiffs Response and Objection to 'Defendant's Response to
Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request'." Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration, the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated July 22, 1992.
The Court having duly considered the foregoing, incorporates herein its trial ruling
(i.e., 4/26/91 Minute Entry), its post-trial Orders dated December 3, 1991 and January 10,
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1992, and its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, and the Court does now make, adopt and
find the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on the 14th day of August, 1985 in the

State of California pursuant to a written divorce settlement agreement.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded joint legal and physical custody of the

minor child, Michelle Nohealani Brooks, now age 11, born September 18, 1980. Plaintiff
was awarded the primary physical custody of said child and Defendant was awarded
specified custodial rights with said child, and Plaintiff, JO ANN NUNLEY (BROOKS), was
ordered to bear the expense of the transportation of the minor child to and from Los
Angeles, California to visit the Defendant, THOMAS M. BROOKS, during his on-schedule
custodial period.
3.

The Decree of Divorce required the Defendant to pay to Plaintiff child

support in the sum of $300.00 per month on the 1st day of each month commencing on the
1st day of August, 1985, and continuing until the said child reaches the age of eighteen (18),
joins the armed forces, is fully employed, is married, is emancipated or upon her death.
Plaintiff was further ordered to pay to Defendant $100.00 per month as child support if the
minor child resided with the Defendant for sixteen (16) days or more in any month.
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4.

The Court finds that at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the

Plaintiff was employed with TWA Airlines, with a gross year-end income of $28,687.24, or
a gross monthly amount of $2,390.60. The Court finds that the Defendant was receiving
disability income at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and, pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement of the parties, had a net income of $1,600.00 per month.
5.

The Court finds that the Defendant, THOMAS M. BROOKS, has a current

gross income of $3,029.26 per month. The Court bases this finding on all of the evidence
submitted at trial, including the evidence that his disability and social security income is taxfree, and including his income producing capabilities, and the Court believes that the finding
is based on due consideration of all of the evidence.
6.

The Court finds that the income of the Plaintiff is approximately $10,000.00

per year (or about $833.00 per month), based upon the stipulated testimony of the Plaintiff
at trial, and the Court finds that her imputed income should be approximately $833.00 per
month. The Court did not find evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff was earning more
than her stipulated income of $10,000.00 per year.
7.

The Court finds that there has not been a substantial and material change of

circumstances based upon its finding that Plaintiff has a minimum of $833.00 gross per
month from her costume business, and further that she earned a profit of approximately
$4,493.00 for the tax year 1990 from her costume business, that she had incorporated into
her tax return a rental write-off of $5,400.00 while operating this business out of her home,
5

and that the Plaintiff had the ability to write-off substantial amounts of expenses through
her business, without being required to take money from the business in a taxable form.
The Court notes that the Defendant claims a $400.00 per month expenditure to maintain
his Ferrari automobile and that the total of Defendant's checking account deposits for the
period May 16,1988 through July 17,1990, shows approximately $173,000.00 of deposits and
$171,000.00 of withdrawals. While there arefcertainexplanations made which could explain
some of the discrepancy, it certainly did not describe or explain away all of the discrepancy
as to the Defendant's expenditures.
8.

The Court further finds that the Defendant stated that he was willing to pay

child support at the rate of $300.00 per month for his share of the minor child's daily needs,
and acknowledged that said amount was higher than the sum calculated under the Uniform
Child Support Worksheet.
9.

The Court is of the opinion that the exhibits and testimony produced by both

parties at the time of the trial do not fully reveal the nature and extent of their respective
incomes and, therefore, the Court cannot draw any more specific findings from the evidence
presented at the time of the trial as to either party's income.
10.

The Court finds from the evidence presented and its additional findings set

forth above, that Plaintiff and Defendant clearly have additional income which the Court
has not been able to compute and arrive at a figure for each party. The Court's best
judgment is that it is at a level which does not justify a finding of a substantial change of
6

material circumstances and, therefore, the child support sum of $300.00 per month should
be left in place, particularly in view of the Defendant's willingness to keep the child support
at its current level of $300.00 per month.
11.

For all of the above-said reasons, the Court found that the Plaintiff had failed

to prove a material and substantial change of circumstances to justify the increase in child
support sought by the Plaintiff in this matter.
12.

The Court finds, as to the visitation transportation expenses, that the reason

and basis upon which the original transportation order in this matter was entered (i.e., the
California Divorce Decree) was that Plaintiff was then employed by TWA airlines and could
thus provide free transportation, or at least it was contemplated that Plaintiff could provide
free transportation, for the minor child from Salt Lake City to Defendant's home in Los
Angeles. The Court further finds that Plaintiff is no longer employed by TWA and cannot
provide free transportation for the minor child.
13.

The Court notes that Plaintiffs husband (an airline employee) has access to

passes and/or discount fares for his family. The Court finds that it is willing to find that
Plaintiff should ask her husband to secure discount tickets for travel of the minor child to
and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiffs husband is willing to do so, Plaintiff should
then send a photocopy of the front page of the itinerary part of the ticket indicating the
amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse Plaintiff for his one-half of that amount one
(1) week prior to the flight. The Court finds that if Defendant does not reimburse Plaintiff
7

for his one-half, then no visitation should occur. The Court finds that such visitation should
be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled visitation and all parties
should cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. The Court also finds that if Plaintiffs
husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, Plaintiff should
then buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement under the
conditions set forth above. The Courts finds that the Plaintiff should cooperate in seeing
that the Defendant has all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the
California Decree of Divorce.
14.

The Court finds that in addition to the above loss of Plaintiffs TWA benefits

that the Defendant has moved from Los Angeles, California to Montana and the Court
finds, in a technical sense, that Plaintiffs responsibility for payment of transportation for the
minor child's visit would terminate upon that condition.
15.

Without relying on the technical statement above, the Court is of the opinion

that clearly the parties contemplated the furnishing of that transportation through Plaintiff
employment as a perk, at no cost to the Plaintiff, and on that basis, she was willing to
provide the benefit to the parties.
16.

The Court finds that all of the above constitute a sufficient, substantial and

material change of circumstances to require each party to share equally the costs of
transportation for Defendant's visitation until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and
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graduates from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until
further order of this Court.
17.

The Court finds that Plaintiff should reimburse Defendant for one-half of the

transportation costs that Defendant has reasonably incurred in exercising his visitation rights
with the minor child of the parties. Based upon the Court's review of Plaintiffs and
Defendant's "Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request", said expenses total
$2,534.50 for visitation expenses from NoVember 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991.
Therefore, Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant for one-half of $2,534.50 or
$1,267.25 and judgment should enter accordingly.
18.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has enrolled the minor child in a private

school, Rowland-Hall St. Mark's, and that she has expended substantial sums of money to
keep said child in a private school. The Court further finds that both Plaintiff and
Defendant are desirous for their child to be enrolled in private school. The Court finds that
the Defendant noted that he did not believe that he had the ability to maintain the costs to
maintain the minor child in private school.
19.

The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant should pay one-half of the

private school tuition, books, supplies, school activities, and school uniforms from the date
of Plaintiffs Amended Petition, November 21, 1988, when this issue was first raised by
Plaintiff, until the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of this Court.
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20.

The Court finds that subsequent to the trial in this matter, Plaintiff presented

a letter, over the objection of Defendant's counsel, from an employee of the Social Security
Administration, dated July 12, 1991, indicating that the Court could not assign or determine
how benefits paid to the minor child could be used. The Court was subsequently requested
by counsel for Plaintiff to permit the filing of a Motion for Post-Trial Determination of this
social security issue and the Court found that the matter should be submitted to it under
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Defendant was to respond to that
Motion within thirty (30) days after filing and no sooner than the 6th of September, 1991.
21.

The Court finds, after review of the matters submitted to it under the "Motion

for Post-Trial Determination," that contrary to its April 26, 1991 trial Minute Entry, it does
not have the power to assign the social security auxiliary benefits received by the parties'
minor child (by reason of Defendant's permanent disability) to meet the Defendant's
obligation to pay one-half of the child's private-school expenses. The social security
auxiliary benefits received by the minor child do not reduce the disability benefits otherwise
due to or received by the Defendant and, in fact, said auxiliary benefits are for the minor
child's use only and cannot be judicially assigned or designated for any other use. The
Court finds that the Defendant should meet his obligations for one-half of the minor child's
private school expenses from his own resources and not from the child's social security
benefits.
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22.

The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for

Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response
to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request," that the parties have agreed that Plaintiff has
incurred the sum of $19,160.00 for Michelle's private school expenses which include tuition,
interest, insurance, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from November
21, 1988 through September 16, 1991. The Court finds that Defendant should pay Plaintiff
one-half of said amount, or $9,580.00, and judgment should enter accordingly.
23.

The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for

Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response
to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request," that Plaintiff has incurred an additional sum of
$5,801.38 for Michelle's private school expenses which include school activities, supplies and
school uniforms. The Court finds that Defendant should pay Plaintiff one-half of said
amount, or $2,900.69, and judgment should enter accordingly.
24.

The Court further finds that the parties should share equally the cost of such

expenses that are incurred after September 16, 1991 until the child ceases to attend private
school or until further order of this Court.
25.

The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for

Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response
to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request," that the Plaintiff has incurred medical, dental
and prescription expenses (not covered by insurance) from November 21, 1988 through
11

March 31,1992, for the minor child, Michelle, of $1,157.24. The Court finds that Defendant
should pay Plaintiff one-half of said amount, or $578.62, and judgment should enter
accordingly.
26.

The Court finds that the parties should share equally, from March 31, 1992,

one-half of the insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription
expenses for the minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has
graduated from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until
further order of this Court.
27.

The Court finds that while the extracurricular activities of the minor child as

shown on Plaintiffs trial Exhibit 5, may be advantageous to the minor child and may be
desirable, the Court finds that the Defendant should not be obligated to pay one-half of
those expenses.
28.

The Court finds that it has no intention at this point in ruling that Plaintiff is

at risk to return Michelle's benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that
the Defendant is not legally disabled.
29.

The Court finds that the amounts awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant

by way of judgment (in parag. 22 above) for the minor child's private school tuition, books,
supplies, school activities and school uniforms is $12,480.69. Defendant's one-half share of
Michelle's medicals is $578.62. The total of $13,059.31 should be reduced by the judgment
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entered against Plaintiff for reimbursement of visitation transportation costs of $1,267.25,
leaving a judgment owing in Plaintiffs favor against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06.
30.

The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income

level of the Defendant in determining the obligations he is to pay on behalf of the parties'
minor child. The Court finds that Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed
herein.
31.

The Court finds that both Plaintiff and Defendant have incurred attorneys'

fees in this matter. The Court finds that neither of the parties are entitled to an award of
attorney's fees from the other and that each should bear their own expenses and fees.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and adopts the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs Petition to increase child support for the minor child, should be

denied.
2.

The prior order of support established by the California Court requiring

Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $300.00 per month as child support should remain in full force
and effect.
3.

A substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred with the

Defendant's move to the State of Montana and the Plaintiffs loss of travel benefits from her
former employer, TWA Airlines. The prior custodial visitation order that Plaintiff pay all
13

transportation costs should be amended to require each of the parties to share equally, at
the best available rate, all of the costs of transportation for the child from Utah to
Defendant's residence until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and graduates from high
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this
Court. Plaintiff should be ordered to ask her husband (an airline employee) to secure
discount tickets for travel of the minor child to and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiffs
husband is willing to do so, Plaintiff should then send a photocopy of the front page of the
itinerary part of the ticket indicating the amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse
Plaintiff for his one-half of that amount one (1) week prior to the flight. If Defendant does
not reimburse Plaintiff for his one-half, at least one (1) week prior to the flight, then no
visitation should occur. Such visitation should be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior
to the scheduled visitation and all parties should cooperate to effectuate these arrangements.
If Plaintiffs husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so,
Plaintiff should then buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement
under the conditions set forth above. The parties should cooperate in seeing that the
Defendant has all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the California
Decree of Divorce.
4.

Defendant should be awarded judgment against Plaintiff for one-half of those

amounts incurred by the Defendant for transportation costs to accomplish his visitation from
November 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991 in the sum of $1,267.25.
14

5.

Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share

of the minor child's private school tuition, interest, insurance, books, fees, uniforms and
school activities in the sum of $9,580.00 from November 21, 1988 through September 16,
1991.
6.

Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share

of the minor child's additional private school activities, supplies and school uniforms in the
sum of $2,900.69 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 1991,
7.

Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share

of the minor child's medical, dental and prescription expenses in the sum of $578.62 from
November 21, 1988 through March 31, 1992.
8.

The judgment awarded to Defendant above of $1,267.25 is to be applied

toward the three (3) judgments awarded to Plaintiff, totalling $13,059.31, leaving a new
amount in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06.
9.

Plaintiff and Defendant should pay one-half of the minor child's private school

tuition, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from September 16, 1991 until
the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of this Court.
10.

On the social security issue, the Court hereby amends its prior ruling in its

Minute Entry of April 26, 1991 and awards all amounts that have been paid to the minor
child, Michelle, as her benefits under the social security auxiliary benefits received (due to
Defendant's permanent disability) to the minor child as her proceeds, and the same are not
15

to be credited toward any amount of support for the minor child by Defendant or to cover
her private school costs.
11.

The parties should share equally, from March 31, 1992, one-half of the

insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription expenses for the
minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has graduated from high
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this
Court.
12.

The Defendant should not be obligated to pay one-half of the minor child's

extracurricular activities.
13.

The Court makes no ruling with regard to Plaintiffs risk to return Michelle's

benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that the Defendant is not legally
disabled.
14.

The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income

level of the Defendant in determining Defendant's obligations on behalf of the parties'
minor child. Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed herein.
15.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant should be awarded any attorneys' fee or costs

in this matter, and each should assume and pay their own fees incurred.
16.

All remaining provisions of the California Order not amended, modified or

altered by this Order should remain in full force and effect.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, to the following, on
this *Q_ day of S n ? \ •
19f2.

Paul H. Liapis
Liapis, Gray, Stegall & Green
New York Building, #300
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Laura L. Hoins
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OCT - 2 1992
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054
Attorney at Law
The Valley Tower, Suite 111 1
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 328-4333
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
^
JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY),
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. C 88 4192

THOMAS M. BROOKS,
Defendant.

Judge Richard H. Moffat

ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiffs "Amended Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce" and Defendant's
"Countermotion" came on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of April, 1991 before the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat.

Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through her

attorney of record, Randall J. Holmgren. Defendant appeared in person and by and
through his attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis. The Court heard the sworn testimony of
Plaintiff and Defendant, marked and received documents and exhibits in support of the
positions of Plaintiff and Defendant, heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the records and

^

/*

files herein and, took the matter under advisement and thereafter issued its Minute Entry
on the 26th day of April, 1991.
Following the issuance of said Minute Entry, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Clarification of Ruling and Defendant filed a Countermotion for Attorney Fees. Defendant
submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court on or about June
3, 1991, and Plaintiff objected to those proposed Findings and Conclusions and submitted
her own proposed Findings of Fact (with footnotes indicating the portions of the Court's
April 26, 1991 Minute Entry and Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact needing
clarification). The Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification and the Defendant's Countermotion
for Attorney Fees were heard on August 7, 1991.
The Court entered an Order (Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Ruling and
Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney Fees) on December 3, 1991. In said Order,
portions of the April 26, 1991 Minute Entry were clarified and other portions were reserved
for further review. In particular, said Order directed Plaintiff to submit a motion and
supporting memorandum to the Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, addressing the issues that the Court reserved for further review. The Court
directed that entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions ©f Law, and Divorce Modification
Order be delayed until such time as such post-trial motion was submitted and ruled on so
that the issues thereby resolved, together with the issues clarified by the December 3, 1991

?

Order, could be included in the final Findings, Conclusions, and modification of decree
Order pertaining to the April 22, 1991.
On or about November 1, 1991, Plaintiff submitted her "Motion for Post-Trial
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues," as directed by the Court. The Motion was
opposed by Defendant. The matter was submitted to the Court in accordance with Rule 4501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Court issued a Minute Entry ruling
dated December 19, 1991 and entered an "Order (Re: Motion for Post-Trial Determination
of Divorce Modification Issues)" on January 10, 1992.
On or about March 6, 1992, upon the request of the Defendant, the Court instructed
Plaintiff and Defendant to submit an accounting to the Court with respect to the amounts
expended by Plaintiff on behalf of the parties' minor child, Michelle, for private school,
tuition, books, uniforms, school supplies and school activities, and medical, dental and
prescription expenses.

Accordingly, on or about May 15, 1992, Defendant submitted

"Defendant's Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request." On or about May 19,
1992, Plaintiff submitted "Plaintiffs Response and Objection to 'Defendant's Response to
Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request'." Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration, the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated July 22, 1992.
The Court having duly considered the foregoing, incorporates herein its trial ruling
(i.e., 4/26/91 Minute Entry), its post-trial Orders dated December 3, 1991 and January 10,
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1992, and its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, and the Court having entered its written
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiffs Petition to increase child support for the minor child is hereby

denied.
2.

The prior order of support established by the California Court requiring

Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $300.00 per month as child support will remain in full force
and effect.
3.

A substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred with the

Defendant's move to the State of Montana and the Plaintiffs loss of travel benefits from her
former employer, TWA Airlines. The prior custodial visitation order that Plaintiff pay all
transportation costs is hereby amended to require each of the parties to share equally, at
the best available rate, all of the costs of transportation for the child from Utah to
Defendant's residence until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and graduates from high
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this
Court. Plaintiff is ordered to ask her husband (an airline employee) to secure discount
tickets for travel of the minor child to and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiff s husband
is willing to do so, Plaintiff shall then send a photocopy of the front page of the itinerary
part of the ticket indicating the amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse Plaintiff for his
one-half of that amount one (1) week prior to the flight. If Defendant does not reimburse
4

Plaintiff for his one-half, at least one (1) week prior to the flight, then no visitation will
occur. Visitation will be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled
visitation and all parties will cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. If Plaintiffs
husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, Plaintiff shall then
buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement under the conditions
set forth above. The parties are ordered to will cooperate in seeing that the Defendant has
all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the California Decree of Divorce.
4.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded judgment against Plaintiff for one-half

of those amounts incurred by the Defendant for transportation costs to accomplish his
visitation from November 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991 in the sum of $1,267.25.
5.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for

his share of the minor child's private school tuition, interest, insurance, books, fees, uniforms
and school activities in the sum of $9,580.00 from November 21, 1988 through September
16, 1991.
6.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for

his share of the minor child's additional private school activities, supplies and uniforms in
the sum of $2,900.69 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 1991.
7.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for

his share of the minor child's medical, derttal and prescription expenses in the sum of
$578.62 from November 21, 1988 through March 31, 1992.
5

8.

The judgment awarded to Defendant above of $1,267.25 is to be applied

toward the three (3) judgments awarded to Plaintiff, totalling $13,059.31, leaving a new
judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06.
9.

Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered to pay one-half of the minor

child's private school tuition, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from
September 16, 1991 until the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of
this Court.
10.

On the social security issue, the Court orders that the amounts paid to the

minor child, Michelle, as her benefits under the social security auxiliary benefits received
(due to Defendant's permanent disability) are the minor child's and the same are not to be
credited toward any amount of support for the minor child by Defendant or to cover her
private school costs.
11.

The parties are hereby ordered to share equally, from March 31, 1992, one-

half of the insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription expenses
for the minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has graduated
from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order
of this Court.
12.

The Defendant is not obligated to pay one-half of the minor child's

extracurricular activities.
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13.

The Court makes no ruling with regard to Plaintiffs risk to return Michelle's

benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that the Defendant is not legally
disabled.
14.

The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income

level of the Defendant in determining Defendant's obligations on behalf of the parties'
minor child. Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed herein.
15.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant shall be awarded any attorneys' fee or costs

in this matter, and each shall assume and pay their own fees incurred.
16.

All remaining provisions of the California Order not amended, modified or

altered by this Order should remain in full force and effect.

7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to the following, on this 3Q
day of S^pV19^-.
Paul H. Liapis
Liapis, Gray, Stegall & Green
New York Building, #300
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Laura L. Hoins
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connected the defendant to the forcible entry and wrongful taking beyond any reasonable doubt. The court did not err in
denying the defendant's motion for acquittal or to set aside the verdict.
The defendant claims that the court erred
in its instructions to the jury on circumstantial evidence and by not charging the jury
as he requested. The paragraphs of the
requested charge at issue dealt essentially
with circumstantial evidence.3 A resolution
of the charge on circumstantial evidence is
dispositive of these claimed errors.
The court charged the jury in part as
follows: "You may give such weight as you
may determine to the manner in which
counsel have put their evidence together
and apply it to the law. You may draw
from any facts which have been admitted
or proved to you such inferences as are
reasonable and logical. Inferences should
not be drawn but from logical relation to
facts which you have found to be proved or
admitted. You should not base any inferences on things that you might surmise,
speculate or guess. This is what is called
circumstantial evidence. Drawing of inferences from facts found, admitted or proved
to prove a material fact." The judge also
charged the jury that the presumption of
innocence "requires if a piece of evidence
offered is capable of two reasonable constructions, one of which favors innocence, it
must be given the construction favoring
innocence."

correct. The charge as given adequately
instructed the jury and gave them a clear
understanding of circumstantial evidence.
See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 172 Conn. 485,
489-90, 374 A.2d 1104 (1977); State v. Schoenbneelt, 171 Conn. 119, 126, 368 A.2d 117
(1976).
There is no error.
In this opinion the other Judges concurred.

Cathleen HARDISTY
v.
Garwin D. HARDISTY.
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued Jan. 8, 1981.
Decided March 3, 1981.

[5,6] The charge must be considered
from the standpoint of its effect on the jury
in guiding them to a proper verdict. State
v. Rose, 169 Conn. 683, 688-89, 363 A.2d
1077 (1975); State v. Bell, 153 Conn. 540,
544, 219 A.2d 218 (1966). After reviewing
the court's instruction on the law of circumstantial evidence in light of the charge as a
whole; State v. Theriault,
Conn.
,
, 438 A.2d 432 (1980); State v. Roy, 173
Conn. 35, 40, 376 A.2d 391 (1977); we are of
the opinion that it was satisfactory and

Former wife filed motion to modify
support and alimony, alleging substantial
and material changes in circumstances.
The Superior Court, District of Waterbury,
Bieluch, J., modified outstanding orders of
alimony and support, and husband appealed. The Supreme Court, Peters, J., held
that: (1) sustaining wife's objection to
question posed to husband by husband's
counsel about value of husband's restaurant
if lease on property were no longer in effect
was not an abuse of discretion; (2) sustaining objection to question posed to husband
by husband's counsel of whether husband
might be unable to pay for college education for son in event that husband was
required to pay for a private secondary
school education for son was not abuse of

3. The defendant also claimed the court erred in
failing to instruct the jury as he requested with
two other paragraphs of his requested charge.
Since this error has not been briefed, it is

considered abandoned. State v. Washington,
Conn.
,
, 438 A.2d 1144 (1980);
State v. Ruiz, 171 Conn. 264, 265, 368 A.2d 222
(1976).
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discretion; (3) conclusion that there had
been sufficient change of circumstances so
that trial court could properly entertain motion for modification of alimony and support was not error; (4) modification of
award of alimony and award of support for
daughter was not error, but (5) modification
of support award for son to require husband
to pay son's expenses at private secondary
school was abuse of discretion, as was
award of $3,000 retroactive support for past
private secondary school expenses.
Error in part; remanded for further
proceedings.
1. Divorce ^245(3), 309.3(1)
In proceeding brought by wife to modify husband's alimony and child support payments, sustaining wife's objection to question posed to husband by husband's counsel
about value of husband's restaurant if lease
on property were no longer in effect was
not abuse of discretion.
2. Divorce <3=>309.3(1)
In proceeding brought by wife to modify husband's alimony and child support payments, sustaining wife's objection to question posed to husband by husband's counsel
as to husband's ability to pay for college
education for son in event that husband
were required to pay for a private secondary school education for son was not abuse
of discretion.
3. Divorce <s=>245(3), 309.6
Conclusion that there had been sufficient change of circumstances in financial
affairs of husband whose income in four
years since divorce was two and one half to
three times what it had been at time of
divorce and whose assets were five times as
valuable, so that trial court could properly
entertain motion for modification of alimony and child support was not error.
4. Divorce <s=>245(2), 309.2(2)
Proceeding to modify alimony and child
support payments may be premised upon
showing of substantial change in circumstances of either party to original decree.
C.G.S.A. § 46-54 (Repealed).

5. Divorce <s=>245(2), 3092(1)
Once trial court determines that there
has been substantial change in financial
circumstances of one of the parties, same
criteria that determined initial award of
alimony and child support are relevant to
question of modification; these require
court to consider, without limitation, needs
and financial resources of each of parties
and their children, as well as such factors as
health, age and station in life. C.G.S.A.
§§ 46-52, 46-57 (Repealed.)
6. Divorce e=>245(l), 309.4
In making its determination of applicability of criteria relevant to question of
modification of award of alimony and child
support, trial court has broad discretion.
7. Divorce @=>245(2), 309.2(3)
Modification of award of alimony to
wife from $125 to $225 weekly, and of
award of support for daughter from $45 to
$75 weekly was not error in light of husband's markedly altered financial circumstances and substantial change in age,
health, station and needs of both wife and
daughter.
8. Divorce <s=>245(3), 309.6
Trial court's conclusion that it had taken into account all statutory criteria relevant to modifying award of alimony or
child support is sufficient without distinct,
special findings about each of such criteria.
C.G.S.A. §§ 46-52, 46-57 (Repealed).
9. Divorce e=*309.2(l)
Right of custodial parent to make educational choices is insufficient basis, absent
showing of special need or some other compelling justification, for increasing support
obligation of noncustodial parent who genuinely doubts value of program that he is
being asked to underwrite.
10. Divorce e=>309.4
Modification of support award for son
to require ex-husband to pay son's expenses
at private secondary school was abuse of
discretion especially since ex-husband believed that son's enrollment at such school
was unnecessary and undesirable.
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Thomas F. McDermott, Jr., Litchfield,
with whom, on the brief, was Emmet P.
Nichols, Waterbury, for appellant (defendant).
Robert D. Houston, Huntington, with
whom, on the brief, were Ralph C. Crozier,
Bridgeport, and Arnold M. Potash, Seymour, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before BOGDANSKI, PETERS, ARTHUR H. HEALEY, ARMENTANO and
WRIGHT, JJ.
PETERS, Associate Justice.
This is an appeal from the modification of
orders of alimony and support. The principal issue is the propriety of an order increasing support to cover expenses arising
out of the private secondary schooling of
the parties' son.
The marriage between the plaintiff Cathleen Hardisty and the defendant Garwin D.
Hardisty was dissolved, on April 3, 1974, at
the initiative of the plaintiff upon a finding
of irretrievable breakdown. The state referee to whom the matter had been referred,
Hon. John R. Thim, sitting as the trial
court, at that time entered certain orders
pursuant to the agreement of the parties.
Those orders awarded custody of the parties' two minor children to the plaintiff, and
required the defendant to pay lump sum
alimony of $20,000, periodic alimony of $125
weekly and support of $45 weekly for each
child.
The plaintiff filed, on July 12, 1977, a
motion to modify support and alimony,
alleging substantial and material changes in
circumstances, in particular the son Andrew's admission to the Kent School, a private secondary school for boys, for the following fall. The defendant countered with
a motion to modify custody, which ultimately was denied; no appeal has been taken
from that denial. The defendant also contested the motion for modification of alimony and support which had, in the meantime,
been amended to allege, as an additional
ground for modification, a substantial and
material change in the defendant's financial
circumstances.

After a full hearing at which the parties
presented their evidence, and after a conference with the minor children, the court,
Bieluch, J., modified the outstanding orders
of alimony and support to: increase alimony from $125 to $225 weekly; increase support for the daughter Laura from $45 to
$75 weekly; and increase support for the
son Andrew from $45 to $150 weekly. In
addition, the defendant was ordered to pay
a lump sum of $3000 retroactive support for
Andrew, representing half of his Kent
School expenses for the previous year. This
appeal by the defendant ensued.
The defendant has raised seven claims of
error. The first two attack the accuracy of
the trial court's finding of facts, while the
third attacks the court's conclusions as unsupported by the findings. The fourth
claim contests two evidentiary rulings. The
fifth, sixth and seventh claims all contest
the propriety of the trial court's conclusions
that a sufficient change of circumstances
had been shown to warrant modification of
the support and alimony orders.
I
The defendant's extensive attack on the
trial court's finding of facts proves, on examination, to be, with one exception,
groundless. We correct the finding to incorporate the undisputed fact that neither
the defendant nor any member of his family had received primary or secondary level
education at any private school. The other
facts in the defendant's draft findings
which the trial court refused to find were
either incorporated in other findings which
the court did make, or were not undisputed.
The finding is thus not otherwise subject to
material correction. Jennings v. Reale Construction Co., 175 Conn. 16, 17-18, 392 A.2d
962 (1978); E & F Realty Co. v. Commissioner of Transportation, 173 Conn. 247,
249, 377 A.2d 302 (1977). The defendant's
challenge to the facts as found is equally
unpersuasive. In each case, there was evidence before the trial court which, if believed, would have provided an adequate
basis for the finding actually made. That is
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all that is required. Fricke v. Fricke, 174
Conn. 602, 603, 392 A.2d 473 (1978); El
Idrissi v. El Idrissi, 173 Conn. 295, 298, 377
A.2d 330 (1977).
The defendant has also assigned error to
the trial court's conclusions of fact, as distinguished from its findings of fact, with
regard to material and substantial changes
of the circumstances of the parties and of
their children. These claims will be considered below in connection with the defendant's substantive challenges to the trial
court's conclusions.

ing that the plaintiff had demonstrated a
substantial and unforeseen change in the
circumstances existing at the time of the
original decree dissolving the marriage between the parties, and that the court
abused its discretion in modifying the orders of alimony and support.

The facts found by the trial court that
pertain to the modification establish that
there was a substantial change in the financial circumstances of the defendant between 1974 and 1978. His gross income in
1978 was two and one-half to three times
[1,2] The
defendant's
evidentiary
what it had been previously, and his assets,
claims ask us to find error in the exclusion
of the answers to two questions posed to including the two restaurants he owned,
the defendant by his own counsel. The were five times as valuable. Although his
first question arose as follows: The defend- 1978 financial affidavit listed considerable
ant's earnings were found to have come in indebtedness, most of these debts were inpart from his ownership and operation of a terfamily obligations. The 1978 affidavit
restaurant known as the Curtis House. The overstated his expenses, since it did not
defendant was asked what the value of this reveal that a mortgage loan represented a
restaurant would be if the lease on the joint indebtedness with his present wife and
property were no longer in effect. The did not disclose that some of his listed explaintiff objected that this inquiry was penses were paid by his wife. The defendspeculative; the plaintiff's objection was ant's salary and benefits were received
sustained and the defendant properly ex- from the corporations which he owned; he
cepted to this ruling. The second question himself set these amounts, and was dearose out of an inquiry into the defendant's terred by federal tax regulations from setability to pay for his son's secondary educa- ting a higher salary. The 1978 affidavit did
tion at a private school. The defendant not disclose that the defendant had the free
was asked whether he might be unable to use of a car for which the defendant's corpay for a college education for his son in
poration paid gasoline, upkeep and insurthe event that he were required to spend
ance. By contrast, the 1974 financial affimoney for a secondary school such as Kent.
davit
of the defendant failed to disclose the
Again, the plaintiff objected that the quesownership
of any restaurants, and reported
tion involved speculation and, upon the trial
markedly
lower
income and assets.
court's ruling that the answer be excluded,
the defendant properly excepted. Both of
[3,4] There was thus no error in the
these rulings by the trial court fall within
trial
court's conclusion that there had been
its broad discretionary power to determine
a
sufficient
change of circumstances so that
the relevancy or remoteness of evidence.
the
court
could
properly entertain a motion
Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 649-50,
368 A.2d 172 (1976); Doran v. Wolk, 170 for modification of alimony and support.
Co:m. 226, 232, 365 A.2d 1190 (1976). There Under our statutes and cases, modification
was no error in these evidentiary rulings. may be premised "upon a showing of substantial change in the circumstances of eiII
ther party [to the original decree.]" (EmThe major thrust of the defendant's ap- phasis added.) General Statutes § 46-54
l
peal is that the trial court erred in conclud- (now § 46b-86); Grinold v. Grinold, 172
1. "[General Statutes] Sec. 46b-86. (Formerly
Sec. 46-54). MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY

OR SUPPORT ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS,
(a) Unless and to the extent that the decree
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Conn. 192, 195, 374 A.2d 172 (1976); Viglione v. Vighone, 171 Conn. 213, 215, 368
A.2d 202 (1976); see Clark, Domestic Relations § 14.9.
[5, 6] Once a trial court determines that
there has been a substantial change in the
financial circumstances of one of the parties, the same criteria that determine an
initial award of alimony and support are
relevant to the question of modification.
Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 401402, 378 A.2d 522 (1977); see Clark, Domestic Relations § 14.9, pp. 456-57. These require the court to consider, without hmitation, the needs and financial resources of
each of the parties and their children, as
well as such factors as health, age and
precludes modification, any final order for the
periodic payment of permanent alimony or support or alimony or support pendente lite may at
any time thereafter be continued, set aside,
altered or modified by said court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party This section shall not apply
to assignments under section 46b-81 or to any
assignment of the estate or a portion thereof of
one party to the other party under prior law
"(b) In an action for divorce, dissolution of
marriage, legal separation or annulment
brought by a husband or wife, in which a final
judgment has been entered providing for the
payment of periodic alimony by one party to
the other, the superior court may, in its discretion and upon notice and hearing, modify such
judgment and suspend, reduce or terminate the
payment of periodic alimony upon a showing
that the party receiving the periodic alimony is
living with another person under circumstances
which the court finds should result in the modification, suspension, reduction or termination
of alimony because the living arrangements
cause such a change of circumstances as to
alter the financial needs of that party "
2.

"[General Statutes] Sec 46b-82. (Formerly
Sec. 46-52). ALIMONY. At the time of entering the decree, the superior court may order
either of the parties to pay alimony to the
other, in addition to or in lieu of an award
pursuant to section 46b-81. The order may
direct that security be given therefor on such
terms as the court may deem desirable In
determining whether alimony shall be awarded,
and the duration and amount of the award, the
court shall hear the witnesses, if any, of each
party, except as provided in subsection (a) of
section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the
marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the
age, health, station, occupation, amount and

station in life. General Statutes, § 46-52
(now § 46b-82), and § 46-57 (now § 46b84),2 Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn
218
> 2 2 1 ' 4 2 9 A^ 4 7 4 (1980), Jacobsen v.
Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 264, 413 A.2d 854
(1979), [ n ma king its determination of the
applicability of these criteria, the trial court
has broad discretion, "[t]he test is whether
the court could reasonably conclude as it
did" Koizim \. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492,
497, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980); Noce v. Noce,
181 Conn. 145, 150, 434 A.2d 345 (1980);
Aguire v. Aguire, 171 Conn. 312, 314, 370
A.2d 948 (1976)
Our review is limited to deciding wrhether
the trial court has abused its legal discretion. As we have repeatedly noted, "trial
courts have a distinct advantage over an
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties
and the award if any, which the court may
make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the
case of a parent to whom the custody of minor
children has been awarded, the desirability of
such parent's securing employment"
"[General Statutes] Sec 46b-84 (Formerly
Sec 46-57) PARENTS' OBLIGATION FOR
MAINTENANCE OF MINOR CHILD
(a)
Upon or subsequent to the annulment or dissolution of any marriage or the entry of a decree
of legal separation or divorce, the parents of a
minor child of the marriage, shall maintain the
child according to their respective abilities, if
the child is in need of maintenance
"(b) In determining whether a child is in
need of maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide such
maintenance and the amount thereof, the court
shall consider the age, health, station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and sources of
income, estate, vocational skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age,
health, station, occupation, educational status
and expectation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate
and needs of the child
"(c) After the granting of a decree annulling
or dissolving the marriage or ordering a legal
separation, and upon complaint or motion with
order and summons made to the superior court
by either parent or by the commissioner of
administrative services in any case arising under subsection (a) of this section, the court
shall inquire into the child's need of maintenance and the respective abilities of the parents
to supply maintenance The court shall make
and enforce the decree for the maintenance of
the child as it considers just, and may direct
security to be given therefor "
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appellate court in dealing with domestic
relatione where all of the surrounding circumstances and the appearance and attitude of the parties are so significant ' Jacobsen v Jacobsen, supra, 177 Conn 262
413 A 2d 854 Koizim v Koizim supra 181
Conn at 498 435 \ 2d 1030 Fucci \ Fucci
179 Conn 174, 181 425 A 2d 592 (1979)
Grinold v Grinold, supra, 172 Conn 194, 374
A 2d 172
[7,8] Applying this test to the present
appeal, we find no error in the trial court's
modification of the award of alimony from
$125 to $225 weekly, and the award of
support for the daughter Laura from $45 to
$75 weekly
In light of the defendant's
markedly altered financial circumstances,
and the facts concerning the needs of the
plaintiff and of Laura found by the court
and disclosed by the plaintiff's financial affidavit, granting these relative!} modest
rrodifications cannot be characterized as an
abuse of discretion
The court expressh
concluded that there was a substantial
change in the circumstances of the plaintiff
and of Laura, with respect, inter alia, to
their age, health, station and needs A trial
court's conclusion that it has taken into
account all of the statutory criteria 3 relevant to an award of alimony or support is
sufficient without distinct, special findings
about each of these criteria
Posada v
Posada, 179 Conn 568, 573, 427 A 2d 406
(1980), Fucci v Fucci, supra, 179 Conn at
181, 425 A 2d 592
The trial court also modified the order of
support for the parties' son Andrew, increasing that award from $45 to $150 a
week That modification included expenses
of $125 a week to enable Andrew to attend
a private boarding school for boys, the Kent
School The trial court expressly found
that the plaintiff had enrolled Andrew in
the Kent School without consulting the defendant and that the plaintiff needs financial assistance from the defendant for Andrew's continued enrollment at the Kent
3. See General Statutes § 46-52 (now § 46b
82), and § 46-57 (now § 46b-84)

School The court found that Andrew is
extremeh intelligent and wants to continue
at the Kent School The court also found
that the defendant is able to pa> for his
son s education at the Kent School but
refuses to do so because he believes a private school at the secondary level is unnecessary and undesirable No one in the defendant s family has ever received private
primary or secondary education In reviewing whether these findings suffice to establish a reasonable basis for an order to pay
the increased order of support, we note
further, that although the trial court repeatedly expressed its skepticism about the
accuracv of the defendant's financial disclosures, 4 the court expressed no such doubts
about the good faith of the defendant's
objection to private secondary schooling
This court has only once had the opportunity to consider whether a parent mav be
compelled to provide private school education for his child In Cleveland v Cleveland, 161 Conn 452, 461, 289 A 2d 909
(1971), we held that "courts have the power
to direct one or both parents to pay for
private schooling, if the circumstances warrant It is a matter to be determined in the
sound discretion of the court on consideration of the totality of the circumstances
including the financial ability of the parties
the availability of public schools, the schools
attended by the children prior to the divorce and the special needs and general
welfare of the children Notes, 133 A L R
902, 909, 56 A L R 2d 1207, 1215 " When
that case returned to this court after action
by the trial court upon remand, we recognized, however that a noncustodial parent
might reasonably and in good faith differ
with a custodial parent as to what school
would be most appropriate for a child at
any particular time
Cleveland v Cleveland, 165 Conn 95, 98 99, 328 A 2d 691
(1973) When such a good faith dispute
arose, we upheld the modification of a decree which had ordered the noncustodial
father to pay boarding school or college
4

The court stated during the proceedings I
will say for the record that this [the defendant s
financial] affidavit was misleading to the
Court
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expenses on the condition that he be consulted about the choice of the relevant educational institution The effect of the modification was to substitute a lump sum support obligation, in a lesser amount, for the
prior obligation to pay all educational expenses
Like Cleveland v Cleveland, the cases in
other jurisdictions reflect the tension between the right of the custodial parent to
make educational decisions in the best interests of the child and the right of the
noncustodial parent, if asked to pay the bill,
to take, in good faith, a different view of
educational choices We have found no
case, nor has any been cited to us, in vvhich
a parent has been compelled to pa> the
total cost of private schooling to which he
objects because of a principled preference
for public primary and secondary schooling
Many of the cases denying such an obligation are distinguishable because the requisite financial ability to pay for such schooling was not established See, e g , Forman
v Forman, 127 NYS2d 17 (Dom Rel Ct
1954), Holt v Holt, 330 So 2d 489 (Fla App
1976), Degoner v Degener, 478 S W 2d 687
(Mo App 1972) Many of the cases affirming such an obligation are distinguishable
because they, like Cleveland v Cle\ eland,
involve interpretation of a prior agreement
or divorce decree authorizing private schooling See, e g , Save// v Sa\ell, 213 Miss
869, 58 So 2d 41 (1952), Bize v Bize, 154
Neb 520, 48 N W 2d 649 (1951), Kern \
Kern, 65 Misc2d 765, 319 NYS2d 178
(1970) Cf Van Nortwick v Van Nortwick,
87 111 App 2d 55, 230 N E 2d 391 (1967) Although some courts have indicated, in dictum, that tuition at a private school was not
an expense which a court could order a
noncustodial parent to pay, Winston v
Winston, 50 App Div 2d 527, 375 N Y S 2d 5
(1975), Ziesel v Ziesel, 93 N J Eq 153, 157,
115 A 435 (1921), in these cases there were
5. It is important to recognize that this case
involves private secondary schooling rather
than college expenses The issues raised in the
college cases on which we express no opinion
are different in two respects from the case
before us Because college bound children are
normally over the age of 18 college expense
cases pose an issue of support past the age of

also financial impediments to such an order
of support Those courts that have ordered
private school expenses to be paid were not
confronted with principled objection to such
schooling in Cappel v Cappel 243 Iowa
1363, 1367, 55 N W 2d 481 (1952), there was,
furthermore, some showing of special need,
and in Williams v Barnette, 226 La 635,
639, 76 So 2d 912 (1954), the parent ordered
to pay school expenses did not appeal that
order
The case before us appears therefore to
be a case of first impression, not onl> here
but elsewhere in this countrv 5 The record
before us is thus especially significant as we
explore these uncharted waters That record shows a gifted child, eager to go to a
private secondary school, and a noncustodial
parent with sufficient financial means to
pay for such education What the record
does not show is, however, equally revealing There is no showing of this child's
special educational or psychological need for
private schooling or of the inadequacy, in
general or for this child, of the local public
schools There is no showing that, but for
this divorce, this child would probably have
attended a private school, in fact, the defendant's family history indicates the opposite There is no showing that the defendant ever agreed to private schooling for his
son To the contrary, the trial court has
found, as a fact, that the defendant believes
that his son's enrollment at the Kent School
is unnecessary and undesirable
[9,10] We have come to accept the unfortunate reality that marital relationships
sometimes break down irretrievably without fault due to the emergence of irreconcilable differences between the marital
partners Joy v Joy, 178 Conn 254, 256,
423 A 2d 895 (1979) The same irreconcilable differences that led to the breakdown of
minontv which is not involved in the case be
fore us In the college expense cases further
more there may be as Professor Clark suggests a more cogent argument that such ex
penses have become necessaries Clark Do
mestic Relations § 15 1 pp 497-98 see annot 99 ALR3d 322 (1980)
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the marriage often spill over into significantly divergent views about child rearing.
Seymour v. Seymour, 180 Conn. 705, 709,
433 A.2d 1005 (1980). In order to minimize
the disruptive impact of such conflicts upon
the children of the marriage, custody may
be awarded to one parent alone; Seymour
v. Seymour, supra; or a monetary award
substituted for divisive joint decision-making. Cleveland v. Cleveland, supra, 165
Conn. 101, 328 A.2d 691. The right of the
custodial parent to make educational
choices is, however, an insufficient basis,
absent a showing of special need or some
other compelling justification, for increasing the support obligation of the noncustodial parent who genuinely doubts the value
of the program that he is being asked to
underwrite. In the light of the totality of
the circumstances in this case, we conclude
therefore that the trial court abused its
discretion in modifying the support award
for Andrew Hardisty to require the defendant to pay Andrew's expenses at the Kent
School. For the same reason, the award of
$3000 retroactive support for Andrew was
also in error.
It may be that the support order for
Andrew should have been modified with
regard to expenses other than those relating to his attendance at the Kent School.
The original award for Andrew was modified in an amount less than the Kent School
tuition. A remand is required to make a
proper determination of what the defendant's obligation to support Andrew should
be.
There is error and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
In this opinion the other Judges concurred.

O

BEAD CHAIN MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
v.
SAXTON PRODUCTS, INC.
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued Jan. 9, 1981.
Decided March 3, 1981.
Action was brought for breach of a
contract for purchase of specially manufactured electronic parts. The Superior Court,
Fairfield County, Saden, J., entered judgment for seller on complaint and on buyer's
counterclaim, and appeal was taken. The
Supreme Court, Peters, J., held that: (1)
buyer's protracted delay in rejecting electronic parts tendered by seller, coupled with
its delay in notifying seller of the alleged
nonconformity, obligated buyer to accept
delivery; (2) provision of purchase order
which required buyer to pay seller $3,475
for fitting-up charges for tooling and giving buyer exclusive use without limitation
of parts as shown in Sketch S-1318 did not
entitle buyer to ownership of tools manufactured by seller to produce the parts; and
(3) buyer's conduct in refusing to accept
parts shipped to it in 1974 and in refusing
to pay tooling charges constituted a breach
of contract.
No error.
1. Sales e=> 178(3)
Even though purchase order made time
of the essence, buyer was obligated to accept late delivery of electronic parts from
seller, in that there was a protracted delay
in rejection of parts tendered by seller, and
there was delay in notification to seller of
alleged nonconformity of parts, which was
readily apparent at time of tender. C.G.
S.A. §§ 42a-2-513(l), 42a-2-602(l), 4 2 a - 2 606(lXb).
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2. Sales s=>3
Provision of purchase order which required buyer to pay seller $3,475 as fittingup charges for tooling and gave buyer "ex-
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mined in this case. The defense hoped to
show that because Tracy had not contracted the herpes virus, it was unlikely that
sexual contact between her and defendant
had occurred.
"As a general rule the resolution of
questions of evidentiary relevance, materiality and admissibility rests in the sound
discretion of the trial justice; his ruling
will not constitute reversible error unless it
is a prejudicial abuse of discretion.,, State
v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1386 (R.I.1980).
The trial justice must first determine
whether the evidence being offered falls
within the definition of relevant evidence
provided by the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Even when the evidence is relevant, it is not automatically admissible.
The trial court must assess whether the
offered evidence, though relevant, is unfairly prejudicial to the opposing party or
would mislead or confuse the jury.
R.I.R.Evid. 403.
The evidence that defense counsel
sought to introduce was that the defendant
had been diagnosed as having herpes simplex 1 and 2 prior to the alleged sexual
assault. The medical experts could not testify about whether defendant was experiencing a period during which the virus
would have been transmittable at the time
of the assault. They also could not testify
to whether a single contact would have
passed the vims to the victim. The relevance of such testimony was tenuous at
best. It would have been of little help to
the jury in deciding the issues in the case,
could easily have mislead or confused the
jury, and was properly excluded by the
trial justice under Rule 403 of our rules of
evidence.
For these reasons the defendant's appeal
is denied and dismissed, the judgment of
conviction appealed from is affirmed, and
the papers of the case are remanded to the
Superior Court.

(o
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Roger L. PONTBRIAND
v.
Virginia May PONTBRIAND.
No. 91-517-M.P.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
March 29, 1993.

Wife filed motion to have husband held
in contempt for unilaterally reducing child
support payments provided for by divorcee
decree. The Family Court, O'Brien, Master, modified support, adjudged husband to
be in contempt, and husband petitioned for
certiorari. The Supreme Court, Shea, J.,
held that: (1) child-support obligation of
noncustodial spouse may be offset by Social Security benefits paid to children on
behalf of that parent, and (2) husband did
not demonstrate any willful disregard for
court's order in reducing payments to account for the Social Security benefits.
Appeal sustained, judgment vacated,
petition for certiorari granted, order modifying support quashed, and case remanded.

1. Parent and Child <s=>3.3(9)
Child-support obligation of a noncustodial spouse may be offset by Social Security benefits made to dependent children on
behalf of that parent
2. Divorce 0=^311(2)
The reduction in the husband's disability pension to reflect Social Security benefits paid to husband and his children should
have been considered by trial court in proceeding on motion by wife to adjudge husband in contempt for unilaterally reducing
child support payments based upon what
children received from Social Security on
his behalf; to ignore the reduction in pension would be inequitable.
3. Divorce <s=309.2(2)
Payment of Social Security benefits to
children on husband's behalf could be considered change in circumstances warrant-
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ng modification of husband's child support
obligation under divorce decree.

Brenda Coville Harrigan, Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys, Providence, for plaintiff.

L Divorce <s=>308
Husband was not required to seek
nodification of divorce decree before rehiring child support payments when Social
Security benefits were made available to
iependent children; instead of seeking formal modification from Family Court, hus5and would be required to inform Family
Court that source of income had changed
md that credit would be taken.

David Strachman, Lipsey & Skolnik,
Providence, for defendant.

5. Divorce <3>309.2(3)
Trial court's modification of child support order, under which husband was
granted no credit for Social Security benefits paid to children, with result that
amount of support payments together with
Social Security benefits increased funds
available for support of children without
showing of additional need, was clearly
wrong.
6. Contempt <3=*20
Party who disregards valid court order
in favor of his own notion of justice should
be adjudged in contempt.
7. Parent and Child <e=>3.3(9)
In contempt proceedings involving
child support obligation, respondent can
raise question of his lack of willfulness and
his inability to pay.
8. Contempt <^61(2)
Whether party is willful in his disobedience of court order is question of fact.
9. Contempt <3=>66(7)
In reviewing judgment of contempt,
decision of trial court is given great deference and will not be disturbed absent clear
abuse.
10. Divorce <s=>311(2)
Finding of contempt against former
husband who reduced child support payments, on advice of counsel to account for
Social Security benefits paid for benefit of
children, was error; husband did not demonstrate any willful disregard for court's

OPINION
SHEA, Justice.
The plaintiff, Roger L. Pontbriand (Roger), and the defendant, Virginia May
Pontbriand (Virginia), were divorced by final decree on November 16, 1990. The
plaintiff has petitioned this court for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari to review
the trial master's failure to give the plaintiff a dollar-for-dollar credit against his
child-support obligation for payments r e
ceived by his children from Social Security
through their representative and the trial
master's failure to consider the children's
receipt of dependency benefits from Social
Security in the calculation of the husband's
child-support obligation. The plaintiff also
appeals from the trial master's adjudging
him in willful contempt. We quash the
judgment regarding the change in the child
support, and we sustain the appeal from
the finding of contempt.
Pursuant to a final divorce decree Roger
was required to pay Virginia the sum of
$575 per month as child support. This
figure derived from the child-supportguideline worksheet, was based upon Roger's monthly gross income of $2,000. At
the time of the divorce his monthly gross
income consisted of medical benefits that
he received from the Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA/CREF) as a
result of his disability retirement from the
Rhode Island School of Design in March
1990. Roger's monthly income was determined by calculating 60 percent of his
wage base versus the total sum of benefits
received from other sources. Under the
TIAA/CREF plan benefits from other
sources include moneys paid to either plaintiff himself or to his codependents. Thus
Roger's monthly benefits from TIAA/
CREF would be reduced by the amount of
any monthly Social Security benefits that
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Commencing December 1990, Roger and
his dependents were entitled to receive Social Security benefits. The monthly total
was $1,488.40. Of that total amount
$992.30 was payable directly to plaintiff,
and $496.10 was payable directly to defendant as the children's representative. On
November 23, 1990, TIAA/CREF notified
plaintiff that since he was receiving Social
Security benefits, his monthly TIAA/CREF
payments would be reduced by the total
amount that he and his dependents were
receiving in Social Security benefits
($1,488.40). The plaintiffs monthly benefit
from TIAA/CREF was recalculated at
$745.46 per month.
Roger, without leave of court, began
making child-support payments of only $79
per month ($575 minus the $496 that his
children were receiving directly from Social
Security). Under this formulation the children would still receive the required $575
but now from two sources. In addition he
filed a motion to modify the child-support
order on December 13, 1990, to reflect the
change in the source of his total income.
On January 4, 1991, Virginia filed a motion
to adjudge Roger in contempt for paying
only $79 rather than the $575 ordered.
At the subsequent hearing on June 3,
1991, the trial master ruled that Roger
erred in making a dollar-for-dollar reduction of his child-support payments based
upon what his children received from Social
Security on his behalf. Since Roger unilaterally reduced his support payments, the
master found him in contempt of the divorce decree. The trial master did consider
his motion to modify support based on his
reduction in income and reduced his support obligation to $454 per month.

and the $496-per-month benefit from Social Security, for a total of $950 per month.
Thus the children would be allowed $375
more per month than the original support
order of $575 per month without any showing of increased need.
Roger asserted first that he should be
allowed a direct credit of $496 per month
toward his child-support obligation for the
money that the children receive from Social
Security on his behalf. Under this reasoning, he argues, he should only be required
to pay $79 per month for the difference
between the child-support order and the
Social Security benefit. In the alternative
he requested that the support order be
modified to reflect his decrease in gross
income and the increase in funds available
to the children from Social Security. The
modification he seeks would require him
under a new order to pay only the $79.
I
[1] We first address plaintiffs request
for a direct credit. The allowance of a
credit for Social Security payments has not
been raised previously in Rhode Island.
We shall therefore look to the experience
of the states that have considered the question.1

The benefits received by the children
were not considered in this modification.
As a result of the deduction in Roger's
gross income, a new child-support calculation was made. Consequently Roger's individual child-support obligation was reduced
to $454 per month. Under this modification the dependent children would now receive both the $454 per month from Roger

The overwhelming majority of states
that have considered this issue allow a
credit for Social Security benefits paid to
dependent children. Windham v. State,
574 So.2d 853 (Ala.Civ.App.1990) (citing
Binns v. Maddox, 57 Ala.App. 230, 327
So.2d 726 (1976)); Cash v. Cash, 234 Ark.
603, 353 S.W.2d 348 (1962); Lopez v. Lopez, 125 Ariz. 309, 609 P.2d 579 (Ct.App.
1980); In re Marriage of Denny, 115 Cal.
App.3d 543, 171 Cal.Rptr. 440 (1981); Perteet v. Sumner, 246 Ga. 182, 269 S.E.2d
453 (1980) (citing Horton v. Horton, 219
Ga. 177, 132 S.E.2d 200 (1963)); Newman
v. Newman, 451 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1990)
(citing Potts v. Potts, 240 N.W.2d 680
(Iowa 1976)); Childerson v. Hess. 198 111.
App.3d 395, 144 Ill.Dec. 551, 555 N.E.2d
1070 (1990); Poynter v. Poynter, 590

1. See also Annot., Right to Credit on Child Support Payments for Social Securtrv or Other Gov-

ernment Dependency Payments Made for Benefit
of Child, 11 A.L.RJd 1315 (1977 & 19^2 Supp.;.
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N.E.2d 150 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992); Andler v.
Andler, 217 Kan. 538, 538 P.2d 649 (1975);
McCloud v. McCloud, 544 So.2d 764 (La.Ct.
App.1989) (citing Folds « Lebert, 420 So.2d
715 (La.Ct.App. 1982)); Frens v. Frens, 191
Mich.App. 654, 478 N.W.2d 750 (1991);
Mooneyham v. Mooneyham, 420 So.2d
1072 (Miss. 1982); Weaks v. Weaks, 821
S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1991); Hanthorn v. Hanthorn, 236 Neb. 225, 460 N.W.2d 650 (1990)
(citing Schulze v. Jensen, 191 Neb. 253, 214
N.W.2d 591 (1974)); Griffin v. Avery, 120
N.H. 783, 424 A.2d 175 (1980); Romero v.
Romero, 101 N.M. 345, 682 P.2d 201 (Ct.
App.1984); Guthmiller v. Guthmiller, 448
N.W.2d 643 (N.D.1989); Davis v. Davis,
141 Vt. 398, 449 A.2d 947 (1982).
In addition several states have extended
this same principle to Social Security benefits paid to children as survivor's benefits.
Bowden v. Bowden, 426 So.2d 448 (Ala.Civ.
App. 1983) (applying North Carolina law);
In re Marriage of Meek, 669 P.2d 628
(Colo.Ct.App. 1983); Board v. Board, 690
S.W.2d 380 (Ky.1985); Cohen v. Murphy,
368 Mass. 144, 330 N.E.2d 473 (1975). In
these states, direct credit is given to the
decedent's estate for death benefits payable to the surviving children.
We shall adopt the rationale of the majority of the states and allow the childsupport obligations of a noncustodial
spouse to be offset by the Social Security
benefits paid to dependent children on behalf of that parent. The rationale for allowing a credit is perhaps best stated by a
recent Indiana decision on the issue. "The
rationale is that the social security benefits
are not gratuities but are earned, and they
substitute for lost earning power because
of the disability." Poynter v. Poynter, 590
N.E.2d at 152. Similarly the Vermont
court recognized that equitable considerations require that a credit be given when
it stated that:
"[E]quity and fairness demand that consideration be given to government child
support benefits paid to the party having
custody. These payments are, in a
sense, a substitute for wages the obligor
would have received but for the disability, and from which the court ordered
*\A
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made. * * * In theory, at least, the actual source of payments is of no concern
to the party having custody as long as
they are in fact made." Davis v. Davis,
141 Vt. at 401, 449 A.2d at 948.
The Missouri court rejected its previous
determination in Craver v. Craver, 649
S.W.2d 440 (Mo. 1983), which disallowed the
credit, in favor of the' majority view.
Weaks v. Weaks, 821 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1991).
In reviewing the proper focus of the inquiry, the Weaks court explained that "the
key fact is that the benefits paid to the
children are derived from funds 'earned' by
the contributer." Id. at 506. 'The focus
of the inquiry should be whether the purpose of child support is satisfied by the
receipt of the social security benefits." Id
(citing Horton v. Horton, 219 Ga. 177, 132
S.E.2d at 201; Potts v. Potts, 240 N.W.2d
at 681). Since Social Security benefits are
specifically provided to replace lost income,
it would be "inequitable to withhold a credit against the child support obligation."
Weaks, 821 S.W.2d at 506.
The Missouri court in Weaks went even
further and pronounced that the minority
rule requiring the petitioner to seek a modification in order to get a credit "is harsh
and unjust." Id.
"In situations involving disability benefits, the party seeking credit most likely
faces a reduction of income, financial uncertainty, physical or mental impairment
and other attendant consequences of the
disability. The additional burden of petitioning the court for a modification typically wastes time and money and helps
no one." Id. at 506-07.
Direct credit should be given to the noncustodial spouse, when the receipt of Social
Security benefits is "merely a change in
the identity of the payer." Id. at 507 (citing Board v. Board, 690 S.W.2d at 381).
[2] In the present case the Pontbriand
children were entitled to receive benefits
from Social Security because of the earned
contributions made by the father. The
benefits received were paid because of
their father's disability. His pension was
TOAUOM\ tn amount for this additional in-
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come from Social Security and intended to
substitute for a portion of his pension income. To ignore the fact that Roger's
income from TIAA/CREF was reduced to
reflect dependency benefits paid to him and
his children would be inequitable. Rogers
income base did not change, but rather the
source. Following the line of cases recognizing that the Social Security benefits paid
to the children are a substitute for earned
income, we must give Roger credit toward
his childO-support obligation for the Social
Security benefits paid.
[3,4] In a minority of states the allowance of a credit has been limited by requiring the petitioner to seek a modification
from the court. The Social Security benefit
to the children may be considered a change
in circumstance that warrants a modification. In re Estate of Patterson, 167 Ariz.
168, 805 P.2d 401 (1991); Arnoldt v. Arnolds 147 Misc.2d 37, 554 N.Y.S.2d 396
(1990); Children Youth & Services v.
Chorgo, 341 Pa.Super. 512, 491 A.2d 1374
(1985); Chase v. Chase, 74 Wash.2d 253,
444 P.2d 145 (1968); Farley v. Farley, 186
W.Va. 263, 412 S.E.2d 261 (1991); Hinckley
v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907 (Wyo.1991). We
decline to follow the states that require a
petitioner to seek a modification for a reduction in child-support payments when Social Security benefits are available to the
dependent children. Instead of seeking a
formal modification from the Family Court
that considers the Social Security benefit,
we require a noncustodial parent to inform
the Family Court, that the source of income
has changed and that a credit will be taken.
"There is a distinction between crediting an
obligation with payment made from another source and increasing, decreasing or terminating, or otherwise modifying a specific
dollar amount." Board v. Board, 690
S.W.2d at 381. A child-support obligor
may reduce or suspend payments for support of the children only after petitioning
the Family Court. Grissom v. Patvtucket
Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1065 (R.I. 1989).
In this case Roger is not seeking a reduction or suspension of the payments but
rather a credit for the change in source of

payments. No modification is necessary.
The Family Court and custodial spouse
need only be notified that the support order
is being met through different sources.
II
[5] In light of this finding plaintiffs
alternative argument that the trial justice
erred in failing to consider the additional
income that the children were receiving
through Social Security is no longer the
focus of our inquiry. We have held repeatedly that an order modifying a childsupport decree will not be disturbed unless
that order is based on findings that are
clearly wrong. Meehan v. Meehan, 603
A.2d 333 (R.I. 1992). Our conclusion that a
direct credit should have been granted warrants a finding here that the trial master's
modification of the support order, considering only Roger's decreased income without
any showing of additional need for the
children, was clearly wrong.
Ill
[6-8] We now move to the issue of contempt. A party who disregards a valid
court order in favor of his own notion of
justice should be adjudged in contempt.
"A contempt order * * * relates to the
power of the Family Court to vindicate the
authority of its decrees by coercing a respondent
into
obedience
thereto."
Lippman v. Kay, 415 A.2d 738, 742 (R.I.
1980). In these contempt proceedings a
respondent can raise the question of his
lack of willfulness and his inability to pay.
Id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 114 R.I. 117,
120, 329 A.2d 200, 201 (1974)). Whether a
party is willful in his disobedience is a
question of fact Borozny v. Paine, 122
R.I. 701, 707, 411 A.2d 304, 307 (1980).
[9,10] In reviewing an adjudgment of
contempt, the decision of the trial justice is
given great deference and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse. Williams v.
Williams, 429 A.2d 450, 454 (R.I.1981). In
this case we conclude that the trial master
erred in finding contempt. By reducing his
payments to $79, on advice of counsel, to
account for the difference between the So-
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cial Security benefits and the support order, Roger did not demonstrate any willful
disregard for the court's order. In fact it
appears that he went out of his way to
ensure that the exact dollar amount to
which his children were entitled was met.
For these reasons the plaintiffs appeal
from the contempt order is sustained, and
that judgment is vacated. The petition for
certiorari is granted, and the order modifying the child support is quashed. The papers of the case are remanded to the Family Court with our decision endorsed thereon.
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Alexander TURCHETTA d.b.a. Camille's
Coffee Shop, Inc. et al.
No. 91-566-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
March 31, 1993.
Landlord sued seeking possession of
certain premises as well as judgment for
back rent. The district court entered judgment by stipulation of parties against tenants in amount of $5,464 plus interest from
back rent and also for possession of premises. Tenants appealed. After case was
referred to arbitration and award was entered for landlords, tenants rejected award
and sought trial de novo in Supenor Court.
The Superior Court, Providence County,
Rodgers, J., entered judgment for landlords in amount of $5,464 with interest and
costs. Tenants appealed. The Supreme
Court, Weisberger, J., held that: (1) business was not de facto corporation after
revocation of its charter by Secretary of
State, and thus, owners were personally
liable for back rent; (2) ledger card in
/»Aninnr»tinn w i t h mannorpr'q t/»«tiinr»nv PS-

tablished arrearages in sum of $5,464 and
it was unnecessary for trial justice to take
judicial notice of stipulation for judgment
that had been entered in district court in
that amount; (3) any error by trial justice
taking judicial notice of judgment stipulation was harmless in light of other evidence; and (4) wife was sufficiently involved in business so that she was principal
and was personally liable for corporate
debts after corporation ceased to exist.
Appeals
firmed.

dismissed;

judgment

af-

1. Corporations <£=»349, 617(1)
Company was not de facto corporation
after revocation by Secretary of State of its
articles of association due to its failure to
file reports, and thus, principal officers of
company who continued to do business under corporate name after charter had been
revoked were personally4iable for rent assessed against company by landlord.
2. Corporations $=»613(2)
Statement of company's owner that he
had not received notice from Secretary of
State as to revocation of company's articles
of association due to failure to file reports
was insufficient to overcome presumption
that mail regularly sent from office of Secretary of State was received at corporate
offices listed on prior reports.
3. Corporations <s»391, 392
Those who seek to insulate themselves
from liability by using corporate form of
business enterprise have responsibility to
see that reports are duly filed and that
attorney for service of process is appointed.
4. Corporations ^=392
If attorney appointed for service of
process on corporation is deceased, corporate officers have responsibility to appoint
new one so that Secretary of States office
may always have responsible party to
whom tn Rpnd annrooriate notices.

